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ABSTRACT PAGE

C o lu m b u s’ ren o w n ed 1492 v o y ag e m ark ed th e beginning of S p a in ’s q u e st to rea ch th e fabled
rich es of A sia by sailing w e s t ra th e r th a n e a s t. Eighty y e a rs later, C o lu m b u s’ d re am of
e stab lish in g a w esterly tra d e ro u te to C hina w a s a c h ie v ed with th e founding of S p a n ish Manila.
Within a few sh o rt d e c a d e s , millions of p e s o s ’ w orth of N ew W orld silver an d A sian g o o d s
flow ed annually a c ro s s th e Pacific via th e M anila G alleon tra d e netw ork. H istorians h a v e not
n e g le c te d th e s u d d e n rise of tran sp acific c o m m e rc e in th e late sixteenth-century. W oodrow
B orah, William L. S ch u rz, O.H.K. S p a te , a n d o th e r n otable tw entieth-century sc h o la rs w ere all
draw n to th e topic. W hile m ore recently, eco n o m ic historians h av e fo cu sed attention on th e
direct flow of N ew W orld silver to A sia from th e sixteenth to n in ete en th -cen tu ries. This
sc h o larsh ip how ever, h a s failed to offer a truly global a c c o u n t of th e Manila G alleo n ’s im pact
on p a tte rn s of co n su m p tio n in S p a n ish A m erica, S p a n ish imperial policy m aking, or global
tra d e p a tte rn s. With th e goal of fostering m ore c o m p re h e n siv e an d interdisciplinary re se a rc h
on early m o d ern tran sp acific trad e, this p a p e r situ a te s th e early d ev e lo p m en t of th e Manila
G alleon within a global m ark et fram ew ork. In c o n tra st to p a s t scholarship, w hich h a s fo c u se d
predom inantly on Pacific silver flows to A sia, a global m arket fram ew ork explains th e rapid
d e v e lo p m e n t of transp acific tra d e in th e late 1 5 0 0 s a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of th e com plim entary
d e m a n d for silver in C hina a n d im ported co m m odities in S p a n ish A m erican m ark ets. By
draw ing on w o rld -sy stem s an aly sis, C h in e se eco n o m ic history, P o rtu g u e se an d S p a n ish
im perial history, along with E u ro p e a n , A sian, a n d colonial Latin A m erican historiography, this
p a p e r c h a lle n g e s existing n arrativ es of th e M anila G alleon by exam ining S p a n ish A m erican
m ark et a s im portant site s of both th e production a n d consum ption of global com m odities. In
doing so, it identifies future a v e n u e s o f re s e a rc h regarding th e im pact of transpacific
c o m m e rc e on historical d e v e lo p m e n ts in colonial Latin A m erica specifically an d th e early
m o d ern trading world m ore generally.
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1
Introduction

“It seems to me that one of the good and most important businesses in this land [the New World] is merchandise,
for in that are the true mines, beyond what one can believe. .. The profit is so sure and so large that a well stocked
shop here is the richest thing in the world, alchemy itself ” —Juan Pelaez de Berrio, alcalde mayor of Oaxaca,
15291

‘This [the discovery of the sea routefrom the Philippines to New Spain] is a great and very important
achievement; and the people ofMexico are very proud of their discovery, which they think will make them the
center of the world.

Unknown Author, Letter to Miguel Salvador of Valencia

Columbus’ renowned 1492 voyage marked the beginning of Spain’s quest'to reach the
fabled riches of Asia by sailing west rather than east. As is commonly known, the Genoese
navigator failed to reach Cathay, finding the way blocked by the vast continental landmasses of
N orth and South America. Despite the initial failure to discover a direct westerly route to Asia,
Spanish monarchs did not abandon the search for such a course. While conquistadores spent
much of the half century following Columbus’ first voyage conquering and consolidating control
over large sections of Central and South America, the Spanish Crown continued to fund voyages
o f exploration, the most celebrated being Magellan’s circumnavigation of the globe in 1521.
Forty years later, the Crown of Castile succeeded in gaining a foothold in Asia through the
establishment of a small colony in the Philippine Islands. By 1571, Columbus’ dream of
establishing a direct, westerly trade route to China was achieved with the founding of Spanish

1 Quoted in Peter Bakewell, A History o f Latin America to 1825, Third Edition (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,
2010), 253-254.
Emma Blair and James Robertson, eds. The Philippine Islands 1493 - 1898, Volume II (Cleveland: A.H.
Clark, 1903-1909), “Letter to Miguel Salvador o f Valencia”, 226.
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Manila. However, it was not Europe that was now directly linked to a commercially expanding
Asia but rather the increasingly silver-rich and chronically undersupplied markets of the New
World. Within a few short decades, millions o f pesos’ worth of New World silver and Asian,
principally Chinese, goods, flowed annually across the Pacific via the Manila Galleon or ‘nao de
la China’ trade network. Would these Asian goods find their way to European consumers or
would they be absorbed by the emerging markets of Spanish America? This was soon a major
question facing powerful Spanish merchants and royal authorities. How it was answered is the
main topic of this thesis.
Historians have not neglected the sudden rise of transpacific trade in the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries. Woodrow Borah, William L. Schurz, O.H.K. Spate, and other
notable twentieth-century scholars were all drawn to the topic. More recendy, economic
historians have shed new light on the Manila Galleon through their efforts to estimate the
amount of New World silver being shipped directly to Asia from the sixteenth to nineteenth
centuries. This scholarship, however, has failed to offer a truly global assessment of the Manila
Galleon’s impact on shipping routes, markets, and patterns of consumption and production
throughout Spanish America and the early modern trading world in general. Its emphasis has
been bullion flows. N or have these new studies taken into account the efforts of Spanish,
Portuguese, and Chinese merchants to create a transpacific commercial network and the
corresponding push by the Spanish Crown to control and ultimately suppress such a
development in the late sixteenth century.
The aim of this thesis is not to provide an exhaustive, global history of Spanish
transpacific trade, but rather to situate the early development o f the Manila Galleon exchange
system within a global market framework, emphasizing sites o f consumption. In doing so it seeks
to focus scholarly attention on the flow of Asian commodities to Spanish America and the
impact of these goods on colonial markets, merchant activity, patterns of consumption, and
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Spanish imperial policy making. In contrast to prior research, this thesis will seek to explain the
rapid expansion of the Manila Galleon trade network in late 1500s in terms of the
complementary demand for silver in Asia and imported commodities in Spanish American
markets. In doing so, it examines how the opening of transpacific trade impacted more than
global bullion flows. While its affect was felt on commerce through Southeast Asia, the Atlantic,
and Indian Oceans, the Manila Galleon transformed inter colonial trade networks in Spanish
America by introducing large quantities of Asian commodities into colonial markets. This
development altered consumption patterns throughout Spanish America and threatened to
undermine the Consulado of Seville’s monopoly over colonial markets and the royal finances of
the Crown of Castile. Therefore, within the global market framework presented here, Spanish
American markets will be examined as important centers not only for the production of silver
but the consumption of global commodities.
The focal point of this study will be the roughly three and a half decades between 1571
and 1604. Together, these correspond to the establishment o f Spanish Manila and the year in
which numerous cedulas issued by Philip II and Philip III concerning transpacific commerce were
compiled and reissued as a single decree. The 1604 compilation formed the basis of a
comprehensive regulatory policy governing transpacific commerce that remained almost
unchanged for two centuries. The historical developments to be examined within this period will
center first on the role of Spanish, Portuguese, and Chinese merchants in the rapid expansion of
transpacific trade in the late sixteenth-century and the effect of this commerce on markets and
patterns of consumption in the Americas and beyond. Second, it examines how such
developments awoke in the Spanish Crown an increasing anxiety over the drain of New World
silver to Asia and the flow of Asian commodities to Spanish American markets. Together, these
flows threatened to undermine the Crown’s ability to continuously exploit its American colonies
in order to bankroll imperial ambitions in continental Europe and the Mediterranean basin.
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To explore the above themes, this study will begin with an overview of the
historiography of the Manila Galleon before introducing a new, global market framework for the
study of early modern transpacific trade. Having delineated this framework, an outline of Asian
and Spanish American economic development during the late 1500s will be presented. From
there, a more in-depth portrayal of Spanish Adantic and inter-Pacific colonial trade will be
provided for the same period with special emphasis on the ways in which the Spanish Crown
regulated this commerce for its own financial benefit. Finally, the study will examine, through a
narrative format utilizing primary sources in translation, the expansion of transpacific trade and
its impact on economic, social, and political developments within East Asia, the New World, and
Spain throughout the last third of the sixteenth century.
As the research presented here is based on a rather limited review of primary documents
and in fact borrows heavily from prior research, it cannot nor does it seek to offer firm
conclusions to the questions raised. Challenging existing narratives of the Manila Galleon trade
and enlarging the scope of analysis will, however, help to identify unanswered questions
regarding the ways transpacific trade impacted historical developments in Spanish America
specifically, and the early modern trading world more generally. The ultimate aim of this paper is,
therefore, the mapping out of a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary research plan that
identifies future avenues of research and primary source material that can help to broaden and
deepen the history of early modern transpacific trade.

A N o te on Sources

The majority o f primary sources referenced here are letters and reports written by colonial
officials or ecclesiastics serving in Spain, Spanish Manila, the viceroyalties of New Spain and
Peru, and various Portuguese trading outposts throughout Asia. Most of these documents were

5
translated into English and published in Emma Blair and James Robertson’s multi-volume
collection, The Philippine Islands 1493 — 1803. This fifty-five volume collection of primary
documents relating to Spain’s colonial presence in the Philippines was published between the
years 1903 and 1909. Since then, it has been heavily cited by scholars and remains an
indispensable source for those conducting research on Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines
and the Manila Galleon trade network.
Despite its heavy use by historians, it must be recognized that Blair and Robertson’s
collection presents a predominantly Western or more specifically Spanish point of view on the
colonial Philippines and transpacific trade. The voices of Filipinos or other non-Spanish
individuals rarely surface in the selected documents nor those of Spanish, Portuguese, or Asian
merchants involved in transpacific commerce. Furthermore, the collection is heavily composed
of official reports and letters to the king of Spain, which convey information on the state of
Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines and Asia in general. In regards to the Manila Galleon
specifically, this results in what is often conflicting information from two or more authors. For
the period in question, 1571-1604, there were those in favor of a general expansion of
transpacific trade and those against it. Individual authors of various reports and letters also
sought to curry favor with the king and advance their own personal interests. As a result,
historians must weigh conflicting viewpoints against one another and ultimately decide who is
being more truthful.
Admittedly, the reliance on documents in the Blair and Robertson collection limits the
scope of this research. While the Manila Galleon is examined within a global framework, the
early history of the trade route is ultimately told here from the view-point of the Spanish crown,
the Consulado of Seville, and various colonial officials. Because of this, definitive conclusions on
the quantitative and qualitative impact of transpacific trade on trade routes, markets, and patterns
of consumption in Spanish America and the early modern trading world cannot be offered.
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However, for the purpose of this study, presenting a new framework for examining early modern
transpacific trade, the Blair and Robertson collection provides a large and important set of
documents that can help to outline future avenues of research that can address the historical
questions raised here.

T h e Colorful Curio: H istoriography o f the M anila G alleon

While the Manila Galleon may be regarded as, in the words of Peter Coclanis, a
“colorful curio or, at best a sideshow” of Latin American history, there is a significant
historiography of the famous 'nao de la China' trade network.3 Many of the principal works date
from the mid-twentieth century, however, with most subsequent scholarship offering few
significant additions or radically new interpretations. William Schurz’s The Manila Galleon,
published in 1939, remains the definitive and only full-length study on transpacific trade for the
early modern period. Schurz was neither the first nor the last scholar to publish archive-based
research on the Manila Galleon, but like him, most historians have examined the development of
transpacific commerce within traditional frameworks such as colonial Latin American, Spanish
Imperial, or less frequently, East Asian or Pacific economic history 4 Most research has also
focused predominantly on the westward flow of American silver to Asia at the expense of more
detailed research on the eastward trade in Asian commodities. As result, the Manila Galleon has

3 Peter Coclanis, “Pacific Overtures: The Spanish Lake and the Global Economy, 1500-1800,” CommonPlace 5, no. 2 (January 2005): 1.
4 See William Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1939). Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial
Trade and Navigation Between Mexico and Peru (Los Angeles, CA: University o f California Press, 1954). C.H.
Haring, Trade and Navigation Between Spain and the Indies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1918).
O.H.K. Spate, The Pacific Since Magellan Vol. 1: The Spanish Take (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota
Press, 1979). Nicholas Cushner, Spain in the Philippines (Manila: Ateno de Manila University, 1971).
Katharine Bjork, “The Link That Kept the Philippines Spanish: Mexican Merchant Interests and the
Manila Trade, 1571-1815,” Journal of World History 9, no, 1 (1998): 25-50. Guillermina Del Valle Pavon,
“Los Mercaderes de Mexico: la Transgresion de los Limites al Comercio Pacifico en Nueva Espana, 15501620,” Pjevista de Historia 23 (2005): 213-240.
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not been examined within a comprehensive global framework that gives equal weight to the flow
o f New World silver to Asia and the corresponding flow of Asian commodities to Spanish
American markets.
Despite being focused on early modern Spanish Atlantic trade, C.H. Haring’s Trade and
Navigation Between Spain and the Indies and The Spanish Empire In America offer a limited discussion
of the development and impact of the Manila Galleon. Following the establishment of Spanish
Manila, Haring noted, “it was soon realized that an opening was afforded for the introduction
into Spanish America of oriental [goods]...to the great advantage of the colonial consumer.”
While there is litde substantive discussion concerning the variety or overall amount of such
merchandise flowing to colonial markets, Haring argues that by the late sixteenth century,
transpacific commerce caused a decline in Atlantic trade levels.5 Although the rapid development
and impact of transpacific commerce is recognized in both works, the Manila Galleon is
examined within a Spanish Imperial framework that emphasizes its affect on Spanish
transatlantic trade and Spanish colonial policy making.
Still, the definitive work on the Manila Galleon trade route is William Schurz’s The
Manila Galleon, a compelling, if somewhat romantic account of the routes roughly two and a half
centuries of history. Unlike Haring, Schurz examined Spanish transpacific trade within a largely
Pacific framework. By focusing on the Pacific as opposed to Spanish America or the Spanish
Atlantic, The Manila Galleon presented an outline of the multiple trade routes linking Spanish
Manila to markets throughout Asia and the Americas. Schurz’s research on the flow of Asian
commodities to Spanish America was also more extensive than anything before and arguably
since. Despite his description of Spanish Manila as a trading emporium by the early 1600s,
however, Schurz focused attention on the flow o f Chinese silk to Spanish American markets. He
went so far as to label the Manila Galleons as “above all...silk ships [because] silks in every stage
5 C.H. Haring, Trade and Navigation Between Spain and the Indies, 45.
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of manufacture and of every variety of weave and pattern formed the most valuable part of their
cargoes.”6 Having identified raw silk and silk textiles as the largest and most valuable of
eastbound cargo emanating from the Philippines, Schurz explains the heavy regulation of the
Manila Galleon in 1604 by the need to safeguard Seville’s transatlantic trade in textiles.7 Although
a pioneering study, the heavy focus on Chinese silk and the broad scope of Schurz’s research
ultimately resulted in a limited discussion o f transpacific trade’s impact on Spanish American
trade routes and patterns of consumption.
Like Schurz’s The Manila Galleon, W oodrow Borah’s Early Colonial Trade and Navigation
Between Mexico and Peru was a pioneering work that remains the definitive study on its subject
matter. In it, the development and structure of sixteenth century commerce between the
viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru is examined. Borah argues that the establishment of the
Manila Galleon route led to a dramatic increase in the volume and value of inter-colonial trade.
While regular commerce between New Spain and Peru had existed since the 1500s, it remained
relatively limited until increasing quantities of Asian goods began arriving in Acapulco in the late
1570s. Along with Harry E. Cross, Borah is one of the only scholars to provide quantitative
estimates for the annual value of in ter-colonial trade during the sixteenth and early seventeenth
^ • 8
centuries.
Building in part on Schurz’s, and to a lesser extent Borah’s work, O.H.K. Spate placed
the Manila Galleon trade network within a larger history of the early modern Pacific in his
ambitious The Pacific Since Magellan, Vol. 1: The Spanish Take. Spate’s work examined the
development of maritime relations between Asia and the Americas during the sixteenth century.
6 William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 32.
7 “a strong movement was set on foot in Spain to limit or ban altogether the importation o f Chinese
silks... [and a] system o f restrictive legislation was instituted, with the object o f limiting the volume o f silks
which the galleons might carry.” William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 32.
8 See Harry E. Cross, “South American Bullion Production and Export, 1550-1750,” in J.F. Richards, ed.,
Precious Metals in the Tater Medieval and Early Modem Worlds (Durham, NC: Caroline Academic Press, 1983),
397-424.
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As the title suggests, the focus of the work was on the creation of a Pacific commercial space by
European, specifically Spanish and, to a lesser degree, Portuguese voyages of exploration,
conquest, and trade. The role of the Manila Galleon trade network occupies a central place in
this history and a considerable part of The Spanish Take is devoted to examining its early
development. Spate elaborates more fully than Schurz on commercial contacts between Spanish
Manila and the wider Asian trading zone. At the same time, a more complete picture of eastern
Pacific trade networks linking Spanish American colonies to the Manila Galleon trade route is
outlined. The importance of New World silver in transpacific commerce leads Spate to also
devote significant attention to the emergence of silver mining in Spanish America. While the
eastern flow o f Asian commodities to Spanish America is not neglected, Spate focuses more
attention on the westward trade in silver and the impact this had on the Spanish crown’s effort
to gain control over transpacific commerce in the late 1500s.
While the work of Schurz and Spate broadened the study of the Manila Galleon beyond
the Spanish imperial or the Spanish American framework utilized by Haring and Borah, a truly
global approach was still wanting. Over the course of the last two decades, however, the
economic historians Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez have begun the process of globalizing
the study of early modern transpacific trade. Unlike earlier historians of the Manila Galleon, they
approached transpacific trade from the standpoint of an Asian, specifically Chinese-centered
early modern global economy as opposed to a Eurocentric model. The main crux of the
argument made by scholars in favor of an Asian-centric framework is the tendency of silver to
gravitate towards Asia throughout the early modern period. For Flynn and Giraldez, along with
Richard von Glahn and the late Andre Gunder Frank among others, the tendency of silver to
flow towards Asia was caused primarily by the high demand for silver bullion in China.
Utilizing a sinocentric model of the early modern global economy based on global silver
flows, Flynn and Giraldez argued that larger amounts of New World silver traveled along
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transpacific trade routes from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries than had been acknowledged
by earlier historians. As a result, the overall value of the Manila Galleon trade is now recognized
as being higher than previous estimates, but by how much remains a contentious issue.9
According to Flynn and Giraldez, an average o f two million pesos’, or 50 tons’ worth of New
World silver flowed annually through Manila on its way to Asian markets. In comparison, during
the seventeenth century European merchants shipped an estimated 50 tons of silver to Asia each
year via the Cape R oute.10
To back up their two million peso estimate, Flynn and Giraldez relied heavily on stock
demand monetary theory as opposed to quantitative data on New World silver production and
export. Within this theoretical model, currency, in this case silver bullion, is traded like any other
global commodity. It responds to market forces and will gravitate towards those markets where it
is most highly valued. For most of the early modern period, Asian markets, specifically that of
China, valued silver higher than those of Europe or Spanish America. In the late 1500s, silver
was priced nearly twice as high in Canton as it was in Seville.11 By the mid seventeenth century,
Chinese political and economic instability caused the value of silver to fall, reaching parity with
Europe in the 1640s. After mid-century however, prices began to diverge once more and by the
early 1700s silver was valued fifty percent higher in Canton.12 Using stock demand monetary
theory, Flynn and Giraldez therefore argue that the vast majority of American silver that was not

9 For an overview o f this debate see Richard Garner, “Where Did All the Silver Go? Bullion Outflows
1570-1650: A Review o f the Numbers and the Absence o f Numbers,” Economic History Data Desk,
h ttp s://h om e.comcast.net/~richardgarner007/Pubs/NetDraft-SilverGoRev.pdf (accessed May 21, 2010).
10 See Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’: The Origins o f World Trade in
1571,” Journal of World History 6, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 201-221. Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Arbitrage,
China, and World Trade in the Early Modern Period,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,
38, N o. 4 (1995): 429-448.
11 “gold was exchanged for silver in Canton at the rate o f 1:5.5 to 1:7, while in Spain the exchange rate was
1:12.5 to 1:14, thus indicating that the value o f silver was twice as high in China as in Spain.” Pierre
Chaunu, Ees Philippines et le Pacifique des Iberiques (Paris : Sevpen, 1960), 2.
12 “A fifty percent premium [on silver] existed this time, rather than the one hundred percent premium
during the 1540-1640 period.” Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez. “Cycles o f Silver, Global Economic
Unity Through the Mid-Eighteenth Century,” Journal of World History 13, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 395.
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remitted to Europe between the late sixteenth and early nineteenth century flowed across the
Pacific owning to the strong demand for and price of silver in Asian markets.
The use of stock demand monetary theory and a sinocentric economic framework
resulted in Flynn and Giraldez’s research being narrowly focused on the flow of New World
silver directly to Asia via the Manila Galleon trade route. This in turn has led them argue that the
rapid expansion of transpacific commerce after 1571 was driven largely by the high demand for
silver in China. In the end, Flynn and Giraldez’s largely one-dimensional focus on bullion flows
has offered little concerning the impact of transpacific commerce on historical developments
outside of the global production and exchange of silver. Nonetheless, their research has helped
to globalize the history of the Manila Galleon while demonstrating its importance in terms of the
early modern silver trade.
While Flynn and Giraldez’s research has brought renewed attention to early modern
transpacific trade, their two million pesos a year average has been challenged. Scholars such as
Richard Garner argue that while their estimate may be true for the entire history of the Manila
Galleon, it distorts the size and significance o f transpacific trade for the time period being
studied here, 1571 to 1604. Garner instead argues that in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, the annual value of transpacific trade fluctuated widely and rarely, if ever, approached
an average of two million pesos. Using historical data on silver production and bullion exports
from the New World that was not available to Flynn and Giraldez, Garner instead argued that an
annual average o f 700,000 pesos flowed to Spanish Manila between 1569 and 1647. 13
In the end, Flynn and Giraldez’s figures may be too high when compared to the
historical data available for the period 1571 to 1604. As Garner pointed out, however,
documents pertaining to New World silver production and export must be approached with
skepticism. Furthermore, contraband trading was endemic in both Atlantic and Pacific
13 Richard Garner, “Where Did All the Silver Go?,” 17.
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commerce and there existed a significant level of illegal, unminted silver circulating within the
colonial markets of Spanish America. Therefore, the precise annual value of silver shipped to
Asia via the Manila Galleon trade route will, in all likelihood, never be known. For the purpose
of the research here, it will be assumed that by the 1590s, annual transpacific silver flows
fluctuated between G am er’s low estimate o f 700,000 and Flynn and Giraldez’s high of two
millions pesos.
O ther recent scholarly contributions to the existing historiography of the Manila
Galleon include research by Katharine Bjork and Guillermina Del Valle Pavon. In the article
“The Link that Kept the Philippines Spanish: Mexican Merchant Interests and the Manila Trade,
1571-1815”, Bjork argues that the Philippines should be viewed more as a colony of New Spain
rather than of Spain. This work is significant in that, like Flynn and Giraldez’s research, it rejects
Immanuel Wallerstein’s core/periphery model o f the European world- system to explain
transpacific trade. Instead, Bjork argued that the Manila Galleon was affected by the interests of
Mexican merchant elites and “the dynamics o f a global economy driven by Asian products and
practices.” 14 In “Los Mercaderes de Mexico Y la Transgresion de los Limites al Comercio
Pacifico en Nueva Espana, 1550-1620,” del Valle Pavon examines the reasoning behind the
severe regulation of the Manila Galleon in the late 1500s. Highlighting Philip II’s financial
difficulties, she contends that the main reason for the heavy suppression of transpacific trade was
to prevent the further drain of silver to Asia.15 While this argument is not necessarily new,
compared to previous research, Del Valle Pavon provided a more detailed investigation of the
rationale behind the Crown’s regulation of the Manila Galleon.
The works reviewed here by no means represent an exhaustive account of scholarly
research on the Manila Galleon. They do, however, present an adequate sketch o f how the study
14 Katharine Bjork, “The Link That Kept the Philippines Spanish,” 25-50.
15 Guillermina Del Valle Pavon, “Los Mercaderes de Mexico la Transgresion de los Limites al Comercio
Pacifico en Nueva Espana,” 213-240.
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of early modern transpacific trade has developed over time. Today, largely because of the work
of Flynn and Giraldez, the Manila Galleon has been situated within a global framework, albeit
one narrowly focused on early modern silver flows. Silver bullion was an integral component of
transpacific trade throughout the early modern period. However, New World silver, whether one
treats it as a commodity or currency, represents only one side o f the proverbial coin. The
overwhelming focus on silver within the historiography of the Manila Galleon has left questions
concerning the flow of Asian commodities to Spanish American markets unanswered. To what
extent, for example, did the demand for imported commodities by Spanish American consumers
drive the initial expansion of transpacific trade in the late 1500s? What type and quantity of Asian
wares were shipped to the New World? Were such goods consumed largely by colonial elites or
did indigenous, African, and laboring-class Spanish and Creole consumers also purchase Asian
imports on a regular basis? And finally, how significant of a threat to Seville’s monopoly over
colonial markets and the Spanish crown’s finances was sixteenth century transpacific commerce?
To answer these and other questions, a more comprehensive, global framework that treats
Spanish American markets as sites of production and consumption is sorely needed in order to
broaden and deepen the history of early modern transpacific trade.

B eyond Silver Flow s

At its heart, the historical narrative of the Manila Galleon is a quintessential global story.
N ot only did it bridge the world’s largest body of water to directiy connect Asia and the
Americas, it transformed commerce in both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. In terms of policy,
the rapid expansion of transpacific trade after 1571 forced the Spanish Crown to confront the
difficulties of governing and maintaining both economic and political control over the world’s
first truly global empire. To begin to understand, let alone tell such a story, requires an
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interdisciplinary approach that draws from European, Asian, colonial Latin American, and
Atlantic historiography (plus Art History and Archeology), along with more specialized fields
such as world-systems analysis, Chinese economic history, and Portuguese and Spanish imperial
history among others. Therefore, while certain aspects of the Manila Galleon trade may be
examined within more traditional historical frameworks, arriving at a more comprehensive
understanding of how the opening of transpacific commerce impacted global economic, political,
and social developments requires an entirely different frame o f analysis.
The global market framework advocated here for the study of the Manila Galleon draws
heavily from recent developments in world-systems analysis and global economic history. Over
the last two decades, the argument of both Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein that
capitalism was invented in sixteenth-century Europe and that Europe expanded outwards to
organize the world around itself during the early modern era has come under increasing scrutiny.
16 Scholars such as Richard von Glahn and the aforementioned Dennis Flynn and Arturo
Giraldez, have argued that in terms of global silver flows, the early modern global economy was
organized around China.17 Therefore, it was the high demand for silver in China that drove the
increase in global trade throughout the early modern era and not European expansion. While
European merchants played an increasingly important role in global commerce during this
period, they were essentially middlemen, facilitating the flow of American silver to Asia in
exchange for various Asian commodities. Building in part on this research, Andre Gunder Frank,

16 See Fernand Braudel, Civilisation and Capitalism 15th-18th Century, Volumes 1- 3 (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers Inc, 1979). Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of
the World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press Inc, 1976) and WorId-Systems Analysis
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).
17 See Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Born with a Silver Spoon”; “Arbitrage, China, and World
Trade in the Early Modern Period”; “Cycles o f Silver”. Also see Richard von Glahn. Fountain of Fortune:
Money and Monetary Polity in China 1000-1700 (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1996), and
“Money Use in China and Changing Patterns o f Global Trade in Monetary Metals, 1500-1800,” in Global
Connections and Monetary Histoy, 1470-1800, ed. Dennis Flynn, Arturo Giraldez, and Richard von Glahn
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 187-201.
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James Blaut, and Janet L. Abu-Lughod among others, advanced the argument that a world
economy existed prior to the beginning of Europe’s overseas expansion in the fifteenth century
18

and that it remained centered on Asia for the entirety o f the early modern period. Kenneth
Pomeranz and K, N. Chaudhuri have also argued that prior to the nineteenth century industrial
revolution in Europe, many regions of China and Asia in general, were more economically
developed and “capitalist” than Europe.19
While the case for an Asian or sinocentric early modern global economy raises
important questions concerning Eurocentrism and western historiography, the arguments for
and benefits of trading one ‘centrism’ for another remains debatable. Nonetheless, historians
must now recognize the economic weight of Asia and the central place of China within the early
modern silver trade. In this respect, pace Wallerstein and Braudel, a global market framework
rejects the idea of European exceptionalism and the argument that the sixteenth-century world
economy was created and in turn centered on an expanding and economically more developed
Europe. Rather, it recognizes that at this time Asia, and more specifically China, enjoyed a
competitive productive edge over Europe and may have constituted the true center of a
centuries-old global economic system.
While a global market framework recognizes the economic weight of China throughout
the early modern period, it is not based on a sinocentric model of the early modern global
economy. As the work of Flynn and Giraldez has demonstrated, the use of such a framework for
the study of transpacific trade leads to a predominant focus on silver exports from Spanish

18 See Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills, eds., The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?
(New York: Routledge, 1993). Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley
California: University o f California Press, 1998),
“Asia’s absorption o f silver, and to a lesser extent gold...in the seventeenth century, was primarily the
result o f a relative difference in international production cost and prices. It was not until the large-scale
application o f machinery in the nineteenth century that Europe was able to bridge the effect o f the price
differential.” K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of A sia and the East India Company 1660-1760 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978), 456. See also Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe,
and the Making of a Modem World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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America. It also explains this export trade largely as a consequence of the high demand for
bullion in China. As a result, Spanish America’s role in transpacific commerce and global trade in
general, is defined largely by its ability to supply a seemingly limidess amount of silver.
Furthermore, within a sinocentric framework, Spanish America is understood to be a peripheral
region whose economy was affected, to quote Katharine Bjork once more, by “the dynamics of a
global economy driven by Asian products and practices.”20 As a result, there is littie emphasis on
tracing the impact of transpacific trade on historical developments in Spanish America.
Stock demand monetary theory and sinocentric frameworks explain theoretically why
silver bullion flowed consistentiy to China throughout the early modern period. They do not
adequately address, however, why Spanish merchants were compelled to ship millions of pesos’
worth of silver to Asia. They also fail to take into account how internal Spanish American
economic and social developments connected but not limited to silver mining, helped to drive
the expansion o f transpacific trade in the late 1500s. Therefore, in contrast to an Asian or
sinocentric model, a global market framework does not seek to explain the development of
transpacific trade predominantly in terms of economic expansion in Asia and global silver flows
to China. Rather, it seeks to understand the Manila Galleon trade network in terms of the
complementary demand for imported commodities in Spanish American markets and silver in
China. The focus on this complementary demand allows for a more balanced approach to
conducting research on early modern transpacific trade. It also focuses attention on the ways in
which historical developments in Spanish America both impacted and were affected by this
commerce.
Emphasizing the role of Spanish American markets as both a producers and consumers
o f global commodities can also help to globalize the early history o f the Manila Galleon beyond
silver flows. While Atlantic remittances of New World silver were crucial in bankrolling the
20 Katharine Bjork, “The Link That Kept the Philippines Spanish,” 25-50.
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imperial ambitions of Philip II, Sevillie’s near monopoly over colonial markets was an equally
important source of revenue. It allowed Sevillean merchants to reap substantial profits from the
importation of European goods to Spanish America, which in turn allowed them to loan
impressive sums to the crown. The opening of direct trade with Asia threatened to undermine
Seville’s control of Spanish American markets and with it, the ability of Philip II to finance his
imperial ambitions within continental Europe and the Mediterranean basin. By focusing on the
demand for imports in Spanish America, a global market framework shows that the rapid rise of
transpacific trade impacted not just bullion flows but also patterns of consumption in Spanish
America and with them, the financial underpinnings of Spain’s sixteenth-century global empire.
When viewed from the standpoint of a global market framework, the establishment of
regular transpacific trade in the last third of the sixteenth-century is significant in several
respects. While it created, for the first time in history, a commercial link between Asia and the
Americas, it did so at a time when the economies of both regions were undergoing periods of
expansion. In Asia and the Americas, silver had an integral role to play in this process. The rapid
expansion of silver mining after 1550 helped fuel a general expansion of colonial economies
throughout Spanish America. This expansion helped to increase the demand for imported
supplies of not only consumer goods but also raw materials and slaves for use in the mining and
agriculture sectors. While in Asia, the demand for silver, principally by Chinese merchants,
helped bring about an increase in inter-Asian commerce and economic development.
As those who argue in favor o f a sinocentric early modern global economy have
emphasized, sixteenth-century economic expansion in Asia was driven in part by an increase in
China’s foreign trade. The main reason for this increase can be traced to the growing demand
within China for silver bullion. The inability o f the Ming dynasty to successfully develop a stable
medium of exchange, whether paper currency or bronze coinage, drove Chinese merchants as
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early as the 1430s to seek out silver as a store of value.

21

By the 1500s, silver emerged as the

preferred medium of exchange for Chinese merchants. Tax policies of the Ming dynasty also
contributed significantly to the high demand for silver in China. Beginning in 1581, the dynasty
required that all land taxes be paid in silver. This policy compelled millions of Chinese peasants
to procure supplies o f the metal each year from merchants. To do so, many expanded
production of silk thread and other marketable goods that could be exchanged for silver. 22 Pardy
as a result of the Ming dynasty’s ban on domestic silver mining, the increasing demand for silver
in China could not be met by domestic supplies. As a result, Chinese merchants turned to
foreign sources and exported increasing quantities of domestically produced goods. This in turn
stimulated the development of export production, especially in the ceramic and textile producing
regions of southern China.
The increasing demand for silver in China and the accompanying increase in Ming era
foreign trade had a tremendous impact on the surrounding economies of Asia. Like China, the
larger commercial zone of Southeast Asia saw substantial economic development beginning in
the early fifteenth-century. As Anthony Reid has demonstrated, “the entire period 1400-1630
was one of rapid monetization and commercialization of the [Southeast Asian] economy.” As a
result, increasing segments of the region’s population became involved in long-distance trade
circuits as both producers and consumers of goods.23 The Indian subcontinent and the wider
regional economy of the Indian Ocean was also witnessing an intensification of commercial
21

See Richard Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Polity in China 1000-1700.
“As a means o f earning the necessary amount to pay taxes, farmers began to engage in the production o f
cash crops or handicraft goods...In terms o f the time and labor spent...silk offered a much higher return
than field crops. Furthermore, the low capital, high-labor type o f investment involved in household
sericulture made it easy for the ordinary farming family to engage in such work.” Shih Min-Hsiung. The
Silk Industry in C h ’ing China (Ann Arbor, MI: Center For Chinese Studies University o f Michigan, 1976), 45.
23
“The pattern o f exchange in this age o f commerce was for Southeast Asia to import cloth from India,
silver from the Americas and Japan and copper-cash, silk, ceramics, and other manufactures from Chine,
in exchange for its exports o f pepper, spices, aromatic woods, resins, lacquer, tortoise shell, pearls,
deerskins, and the sugar exported by Vietnam and Cambodia.” Anthony Reid, s‘ outheast A sia in the Age of
Commerce 1450-1680, Vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 129.
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activity, expansion of long-distance trade, and an increasing focus on production for the export
market during this period.24 These developments helped to meet and were partly driven by the
growing demand for silver in China and the subsequent increase in the velocity and supply of
silver along global trade routes.25
The high demand for silver in China has led historians to regard the country as a
“seemingly bottomless silver sink” during the early modern period.26 The main sources o f the
silver flowing into the Chinese sink throughout the sixteenth-century were Japan and the
colonies of New Spain and Pern. While almost the entirety of Japanese production found its way
directly to China, American silver, before the opening of the Manila Galleon trade route,
followed a more indirect path. With the discovery o f the vast silver deposits of Peru, namely the
mountain of Potosi, along with the significant reserves of New Spain in the mid 1500s,
tremendous amounts o f silver began to flow across the Atlantic and into Europe.27 Until the
1580s when transpacific trade began to take off, the majority of New World production ended
up in Europe. Once in the hands o f European merchants, an estimated thirty to forty percent of
this total was shipped annually to Asia in exchange for spices, textiles, ceramics, and other
wares.28 Spain’s conquest and the subsequent development of New World resources thus helped
to feed the demand for silver in China and the demand for Asian imports in Europe.
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K.N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
209.
25”The increase o f [Southeast Asian] production for the world market would not have been possible
without a great increase in the money supply.” Anthony Reid, ‘southeast A sia in the Age of Commerce 14501680, Vol. 2, 93. “India had a massive balance o f trade surplus with Europe and some with West Asia [as a
result] India received massive amounts o f silver and some gold from the West...Since India produced little
silver o f its own, it used the imported silver mostly for coinage or re-export...India seems to have had a
balance o f trade deficit with Southeast Asia, or at least India re-exported silver there, especially to China.”
Gunder Frank, ReOrient, 87-88.
26 Dennis Flynn and Artuto Giraldez, “Born with a Silver Spoon,” 206.
27
An estimated 150,000 tons o f silver was mined in Latin America between 1500 and 1800. This figure,
which has been called conservative, constitutes over 80 percent o f world production for the period in
question. The majority o f this total was exported to Europe. Dennis Flynn and Artuto Giraldez, “Born
with a Silver Spoon,” 202.
28 Gunder Frank, R^Orient, 143-144.
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While the increase in global silver flows helped to drive economic expansion in Asia and
the early modern trading world in general, the development of silver mining in New Spain and
Peru caused commercial developments in the Spanish colonies of the New World to trend
upwards throughout the second half of the sixteenth-century. Silver output was already
substantial in the 1560s, amounting to over fifty million pesos a year, but production was set to
increase dramatically following the introduction of the mercury amalgamation process in Potosi
in the early 1570s. By the opening of the seventeenth-century, silver production would amount
to 120 million pesos annually before entering a temporary phase o f decline in the first half of the
seventeenth-century. The rapid expansion of the mining industry helped to further the
development of colonial economies, placing demands on local agriculture and artisan trades to
supply the growing size and number of mining centers. 29
As mining grew, so did Spanish American cities. Along with widespread economic
development, the process of urbanization in the New World was also increasing during the
second half of the sixteenth-century. In New Spain alone, the number o f vednos, or city-dwelling
male heads of households, rose from 11,000 to 36,000 between 1580 and 1630. As Louisa Schell
Hoberman puts it, urbanization, coupled with commercial expansion, resulted in the emergence
of “a more sophisticated consuming public [that demanded] hitherto unknown or unavailable
products, provided by merchants.” 30 While consumers demanded larger supplies of goods, the
mining and agricultural industries also required increasing quantities of raw iron, metal tools, and
mercury. The demand for manufactures, luxury wares, and supplies o f iron and mercury in the
already undersupplied markets of the Americas was therefore increasing at the same moment
that direct trade with Asia became possible.
The increasing demand for foreign imports, be they supplies o f iron and mercury or
29 Stanley J Stein and Barbara Stein, Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1970), 29.
qn
Louisa Hoberman, Mexico's Merchant Elite, 1590 - 1660 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 7.
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textiles and household wares, is most evident in the booming mining centers o f the late 1500s.
At this time, Potosi, Zacatecas and other smaller mining centers were highly commercial and
monetized urban economies that were dependent on regional and long- distance trade for a
majority of their material needs. While the buying power of social, political, and economic elites
in such urban mining centers was substantial, they do not represent the only consumers in such
markets. As Jane Mangan has shown for sixteenth-century Potosi, the increase in the number of
indigenous workers receiving cash wages for mine labor and the wide circulation of unminted
silver allowed laborers to become regular consumers of imported goods as well. 31 Supplying the
needs of Potosfs consumers was not restricted to Spanish merchants who possessed ties to
regional or overseas trade centers. By the late 1500s, indigenous, free black, and Creole women
had emerged as prominent urban merchants who purchased supplies of goods outside of Potosi
only to resell them at a considerable profit in the city.

32

While further research is needed, the

inner dynamics of most Spanish American urban economies centered on silver and gold mining
likely resembled that o f Potosi.
O ther urban markets such as Lima, Quito, Puebla, and Mexico City were also, to varying
degrees, dependent on imported manufactures, although few could match the notorious levels of
conspicuous consumption found in mining towns. Nevertheless, there were substantial
commercial profits to be had for those with the means and abilities import and distribute
material goods to these growing and sometimes remote urban centers. Sixteenth-century Quito
represented one such urban economy that was relatively isolated within the Andean highlands of
South America yet found its markets regularly stocked with European and by the late 1500s,
Asian imports. As Kris Lane discovered in his study o f sixteenth-century Quito, “merchants
large and small and of European, indigenous, or mixed heritage h ad .. .transformed [Quito] into a
31 Jane Mangan, Trading Roles: Gender; Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Rotosi (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2005), 43, 35, 52.
32 Jane Mangan, Trading Roles: Gender; Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosi, 43, 35, 52.
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consumer’s paradise” by the 1590s and catered to “discriminating consumers of various
ethnicities.”33
While colonial demand for imports was undoubtedly substantial, gauging the size and
consuming capacity of New World markets is difficult. Most estimates place Spanish America’s
European population circa 1600 at 200,000, with these individuals being the most likely
consumers of imported goods. Textiles, porcelain, jewelry, furniture, foodstuffs and other goods
would have been heavily desired by colonists of European ancestry as indicators of social status.
Anyone aspiring to higher social standing would have also utilized Asian imports as a means of
distancing themselves from the lower classes. N ot all such aspirants were Europeans. An
estimated five to ten percent of the Indian population, the Native American elite, were also
regular consumers.34 In New Spain and Peru, the total Indian population circa 1570 is estimated
to have been around three million. By the first decades o f the 1600s, this number had fallen to
approximately two million, a development that undoubtedly reduced the number and purchasing
power of the Indian elite. 35 Nonetheless, they would have remained avid consumers of imported
goods. Observations by merchants and colonial officials in the late 1500s also indicate that some
imports, especially textiles, were consumed regularly by European, Creole and indigenous
laborers. Ultimately, however, a more complete understanding of sixteenth-century colonial
markets and patterns of consumption awaits further archival research.
The establishment of the Manila Galleon trade network in the 1570s thus provided a
link between the complementary demand for silver in China and imported commodities in
Spanish America. As a result, the value of transpacific trade expanded rapidly over the last third
33 Kris Lane, Quito 1599: City and Colony in Transition (Albuquerque, NM: University o f N ew Mexico Press,
2002), 57, 174.
34 “Almost from the first, [Indian elites] consciously sought to widen the gape between themselves and the
Indian mass by adopting Spanish culture.. .and seeking to conform to the Spanish image o f a gendemen
and hidalgo.” J. I. Israel, Race, Class, and Politics in Colonial Mexico (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975),
44.
35 Peter Bakewell, A. Histoty of Eatin America, 2nd Edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997), 160-163.
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of the sixteenth-century. Exact figures are lacking, but by the end of the sixteenth- century,
somewhere between 700,000 to two million pesos’ worth of New World silver flowed annually
through Manila on its way to Asian markets. Spanish America’s trade with Asia was, therefore,
comparable if not equal to Europe’s commerce with the East by the late 1500s.
In terms of silver flows, the Manila Galleon was far from a commercial sideshow of the
early modern global economy. Undoubtedly, the high price of silver in China, as much as twice
the going rate in Europe, played an important role in the growth o f transpacific trade throughout
the last decades of the sixteenth-century. It was, however, not the only factor. Economic
expansion throughout Spanish America was also at this time increasing the demand and
consuming capacity of colonial markets for imported textiles, household goods, spices, and other
commodities that could not be produced within the Americas. While colonial consumers had
access to European imports via Spanish transatlantic trade, Sevillean merchants actively sought
to limit the supply of such goods in colonial markets in order to increase profit margins. The
opening of transpacific trade thus helped to meet the increasing and chronically unmet demand
for imports by colonial consumers throughout Spanish America. Therefore, it was the
complementary demand for silver in China and imported commodities in Spanish America that
drove the rapid development of the Manila Galleon trade network in late sixteenth century.

T h e Structure o f Sixteenth Century Spanish Atlantic Trade

In order to understand fully how the demand for Asian imports by colonial consumers
in Spanish America helped to drive the expansion o f transpacific commerce it is necessary to
understand the structure of sixteenth century Spanish Atlantic trade. Columbus’ maiden voyage
in 1492 and Spain’s conquest of large sections of Central and South America in the proceeding
decades, connected these regions with global trade routes linking Europe, Africa, and Asia.
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Having established control over millions of indigenous peoples and their imperial states, the
Crown was highly protective of its newly won empire in the Americas. As a result, an
increasingly elaborate imperial structure was developed throughout the sixteenth- century to
prevent rival European merchants from gaining access to colonial markets and the increasing
quantities of precious metals being mined throughout the Americas. While it is tempting to label
such an approach as mercantilist, Spanish officials did not possess or draw from a predesigned
commercial playbook in the sixteenth century. Rather than instituting a set of clearly defined and
articulated trade regulations, Spanish imperial policy towards its American colonies was a
reaction to economic and political developments taking place on the ground. As Clarence Haring
argued in a pioneering study, it was haphazard at best, driven by “blind opportunism” on the
part of the Crown and the Spanish merchant community. 36
The “blind opportunism” of the Crown towards its colonial territories was shaped and
in part driven by several political and social factors. Unlike most territories falling within the
Spanish Crown’s sphere of imperial control in the sixteenth-century, the colonies of the New
World were considered to be the personal possessions of the monarch. In comparison, Iberian
kingdoms such as Aragon and cities such as Barcelona retained a considerable degree of control
over their internal governance despite pledging allegiance to the Spanish king. This political
situation greatly restrained the authority o f the Crown on the Peninsula, making it difficult to
raise taxes or force economic concessions. As a result, the financial burden of empire fell largely
on the shoulders of Castilians and the silver-rich colonies of the New World throughout the
second half o f the sixteenth century. Together with the prevailing commercial and economic
milieu of early modern Spain which stressed the acquisition of steady, reliable income streams
over commercial risk taking, the Crown’s direct control of its New World colonies led it to adopt
a commercially conservative, rent-seeking approach to colonial trade.
36 C.H. Haring, Trade and Navigation, 129.
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The overwhelming importance placed on securing a steady and reliable stream of
income from the New World is clearly demonstrated by the Crown’s stance on colonial
development and the establishment of the Sevillean Consulado in 1543. On the one hand, the
development of colonial economies was closely controlled, an approach that Haring described as
being “excessively paternalistic.”37 This paternalistic attitude entailed an active encouragement of
colonial economic development so long as it did not conflict with existing industries in Spain.
Silver mining, for example, along with sugar, cacao, and cochineal production, were all New
World industries that received the blessing of the Crown. Peruvian olive oil and wine production,
on the other hand, faced prohibition due to the fear of competition with Spanish imports. That
its colonies should develop and prosper was never questioned by the Crown; they should do so,
however, in complement to the (favored) Spanish economy.
By the last third o f the sixteenth-century, the New World mining industry emerged as a
proverbial cash cow for both the king and the Consulado. Like the colonies themselves,
American silver reserves fell under the personal control of Philip II. Rather than exploit them
through government-run mines, the Crown allowed private Spanish colonists to incur the
commercial risks and substantial start-up costs that mining entailed. All extracted silver was,
however, subject to royal taxes levied at both New World mints or smeltery houses and Atlantic
ports. The main royal tax, known as the quinto real, was set at a fifth of total production, but in
many places this rate was lowered to a tenth or less in order to stimulate the expansion of
mining. Increasing the volume of American silver and gold production remained a prime
objective for the Crown throughout the early modem period. Doing so increased royal tax
revenue and annual remittances to Spain. It also helped to expand colonial consumption of
European imports delivered by the Consulado.

37 C.H. Haring, Trade and Navigation, 123.
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Along with the quinto real, the almojarifavgo was another major source of crown revenue
from the Indies. The almojarifaqgo constituted a customs duty collected at both Seville and
Atlantic ports in the Americas. In Spain, a five percent duty was levied on both imports and
exports while in the Indies, imported goods were taxed at ten percent and exports two and a
half.

38

That New World exports were taxed at a much lower rate indicates that the Crown was

sincere in fostering the development of colonial economies. Again, however, Charles V and
Philip II were highly selective in terms of what colonial industries to encourage and what sectors
of the sixteenth-century colonial economy to support with royal financing and the granting of
commercial privileges.
This active management o f colonial economic development was driven in part by the
need to safeguard the commercial interests of the Consulado. Composed o f powerful Sevillean
merchants who lent money to the Crown, the Consulado was granted the authority to manage all
commerce between Spain and its colonial dependencies in the New World. This trade monopoly
allowed Sevillean merchants to control the supply of certain goods circulating within the colonial
economy. In return for this privilege, they regularly loaned impressive sums of money to the
Crown. In practice, the commercial policies of the Consulado actively sought to limit the volume
o f European imports irTthe Americas, thereby driving up the price of these goods. As Clarence
Haring put it, these monopolistic practices resulted in colonial markets being “kept chronically
understocked [with the Consulado constituting] a perpetual coalition for the exploitation of the
[colonial] public, and in restraint o f trade.”39 In effect, Sevillean merchants sought to maintain
artificial market conditions throughout the Indies in order to insure high profit margins from
transatlantic trade. In 1567 Fray Tomas Mercado noted that as a result, “a vara [about 33 bolt

38 Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492-1700 (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1984), 243.
39

C.H. Haring, Trade and Navigation, 137.
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inches] of velvet worth 1,000 maravedis in Seville would cost 2,000 maravedis in the Indies.”40
While highly advantageous to the profits of the Sevillean merchant community and royal tax
receipts from the almojarifa^go, this practice also helped to ensure high remittances of private
silver to Spain. As a consequence of the Consulado’s price fixing, however, colonial merchant
and consumer demand for imported goods was left largely unfulfilled.
The Crown’s rent-seeking approach towards its New World colonies had a profound
impact on the structure of Atlantic trade. At first, commerce with the Americas stimulated the
Spanish economy. Colonial demand for foodstuffs led to an expansion o f Iberian agriculture and
the need for iron tools, steel weapons, leather goods and textiles drove the expansion of urban
production. By the mid 1500s, however, colonial development and political consolidation had
produced an increase in agriculture and animal husbandry in the Americas. The demand for
Spanish foodstuffs fell off while the need for manufactures and luxury goods increased beyond
the productive capacity of Spanish artisans. Unable to procure the necessary goods from Spain
alone, the merchants of Seville began to turn increasingly to the wider economy of Europe to
acquire the wares needed to load ships bound for the New World.41 Thus, despite their near
monopoly of transatlantic trade, the Sevillean Consulado was, by the late 1500s, evolving into a
commercial middleman, facilitating commerce between the larger economy of Europe and the
specie-rich markets of the Americas.42
While the Consulado’s monopoly over colonial markets was never perfect, Seville was
able to dominate sixteenth and early seventeenth-century trade with Spanish America in all but
one commodity; African slaves. The inability of Spain to successfully challenge Portuguese
control of the African slave trade in the sixteenth-century forced the Crown of Castile to revert
40 Quoted in Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 245.
41 J.H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (New York: Knopf, 1966), 114. John Fisher, The Economic Aspects
ojSpanish Imperialism, 1492-1810 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997), 37-42.
Stanley J Stein and Barbara Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Eatin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). O.H.K. Spate, The Spanish Take, 206.
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to issuing licenses to Portuguese traders. These licenses granted their owner permission to
im port merchandise to Spanish America. In exchange for this privilege, individual traders were
required to deliver African slaves to designated colonial markets. Official licenses were not
valued primarily for the right to trade in slaves, however, as substantially larger profits could be
realized by importing European wares to colonial markets.
For the period being examined here, 1571-1604, Portuguese importation of African
slaves and other commodities to Spanish America remained limited. In the early 1500s, the total
volume of the Spanish Atlantic slave trade was relatively small, amounting to some 500
individuals a year between 1521 and 1550. After mid-century, the total rose modesdy to an
average of 800 slaves for the period 1551 to 1595. By the opening of the seventeenth-century the
inflow of slaves to Spanish America had increased dramatically and averaged over 2800 annually
from 1600 to 1645.43 The steady growth of the trade during this period was due in part to an
increase on the supply side by both Portuguese and African merchants. Demand in Spanish
America, however, also played a key role. Colonial economic expansion led by the mining and
agricultural sectors demanded an increasing number o f laborers. While indigenous workers
provided the majority of labor, their numbers steady declined throughout the 1500s. By the first
decades of the seventeenth-century, indigenous population levels hit a low point in both New
Spain and Peru before stabilizing and recovering slowly after 1650. As the substantial growth in
slave imports after 1595 indicates, the decline o f the indigenous work force caused an increasing
turn to imported slave labor throughout the Americas. This in turn allowed Portuguese traders to
expand their importation of other commodities and challenge the Consulado’s dominance of
colonial markets.

43 Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Consensus (Madison, Wisconsin: The University o f Wisconsin
Press, 1969), 25.
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Together, the Crown’s stance on colonial industries and the Consulado’s trade policies
stressed the preservation of large, annual silver remittances to Spain and high, immediate profits
for Sevillean merchants. Although significant, silver remittances from the Americas never
constituted a majority of Crown revenue. On average, they amounted to some twenty percent of
royal income each year. The ability to pay interest on existing loans and receive new infusions of
cash from both Sevillean and European bankers, however, depended heavily on the annual
arrival of Atlantic treasure fleets.
From the beginning of his reign, Philip II was dependent on deficit financing to cover
the ever-increasing military expenditures required to defend his scattered imperial domains. To
maintain both naval and land defenses, the Crown resorted to the asiento and the juro de resguardo.
The asiento constituted a short-term loan that was backed by a specified revenue stream such as
the quinto real. The Crown negotiated individual asientos with various European bankers and
powerful merchant houses in Seville and pledged to repay each in full on a specified date.
Generally, these loans accumulated interest at an annual rate of ten to fourteen percent. When
the Crown failed to repay a mature asiento, the holder was guaranteed an additional ten percent of
the loan's value. The juro de resguardo on the other hand, was a long-term bond with an interest
rate of between five and ten percent.44
By the last third of the sixteenth-century, Philip II’s mounting military expenditures in
•#

Europe necessitated the pledge of his entire share of New World silver as collateral to European
bankers. As a result, the merchants of Seville and, beginning in the 1550s, Genoese bankers were
in reality the principle recipients of the Spanish Crown’s share of American treasure. The heavy
reliance on the asiento to cover imperial expenses, however, forced Philip II to declare medios
generates in 1557, 1575, and 1596. Each was essentially a declaration of bankruptcy and “involved

44 Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 297-298.
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a repudiation of outstanding asientos and compensation of holders with jurors at lower interest
j_
>?45
rates.

Together, Philip IPs reliance on monetary loans backed by New World revenue streams
and the Consulado’s increasing dependence on European imports meant that preserving Seville’s
control over colonial markets was vital to insuring the financial well being o f the Spanish
monarchy. This trade monopoly not only provided high commercial profits for the Consulado's
members, it allowed them to loan impressive sums of money to the king and guaranteed a steady
stream of silver remittances from the New World. For the Crown, a decrease in either the flow
of silver to Spain or the commercial profits of Sevillean merchantswould have reduced its ability
to service existing debt or contract for further loans. In short, a failure to safeguard the
Consulado’s monopoly would have forced the Crown to confront the potential of financial
insolvency and with it the collapse of its imperial designs throughout continental Europe.

T h e Structure o f Early Colonial Trade

‘I t seems to me that one o f the good and most important businesses in this land [the N ew World] is merchandise,
fo r in that are the true mines, beyond what one can believe. .. The profit is so sure and so large that a well stocked
shop here is the richest thing in the world, alchemy itse lf” —Juan Pelaez de Berrio, alcalde mayor of Oaxaca,

1529 46

By the mid sixteenth-century, the Consulado and Casa de la Contratacion (House of
Trade) had together created a sophisticated commercial network and flotilla system designed to
transport goods across the Atlantic and ferry safely back to Spain the majority of the New

45 Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 298.
46 Quoted in Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin America to 1825, Third Edition, 253-254.
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W orld’s gold and silver bullion production. However, this transatlantic trade network terminated
at only a handful of ports along the coastline of the Americas. Once imported merchandise from
Seville arrived in the New World it had to be transported to regional markets located throughout
the interior and along the Pacific coastline of the Americas. As a result, a small but significant
overland and Pacific commercial network developed in tandem with Atlantic trade to circulate
European imports, locally produced goods, and precious metals between the regional markets of
New Spain, Panama, and Peru.
While there existed several Atlantic ports in the mid 1500s where Spanish galleons
frequently unloaded European imports, the majority of traffic was funneled through Veracruz
and Nombre de Dios. Veracruz constituted the principal port of New Spain and was connected
directly to Mexico City, Puebla, and other urban centers of central Mexico. Supplying the colony
of Peru however, proved to be a far more difficult endeavor. Nombre de Dios, replaced in 1597
by Portobelo, was the main commercial port along the Isthmus of Panama’s Atlantic coast. Here,
goods were unloaded and transported across the Isthmus to Panama City by a combination of
oar driven boats, Indian laborers, African slaves, and draft animals. Although the distance was
relatively short, it was a long and difficult journey involving sixty miles of movement along the
coastline, weeks’ worth of travel against the current of the Rio de Chagres, and a fifteen-mile
hike through dense tropical forests. The Florentine merchant Francesco Carletti described his
experience of the crossing in 1594 as being “so bad that nothing worse can ever be imagined.”47
After reaching Panama City, goods destined for Peru were loaded onto ships for another long
and difficult journey southward. By the time Europeans imports actually reached El Callao, the
principal port of not only Lima but the entire Pacific coast of South America, their prices in

47 Francesco Carletti, M y Voyage Around the World,, trans. Herbert Weinstock (New York: Pantheon Books,
1964), 29.
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comparison to those of New Spain had increased substantially due primarily to the difficulties
involved in shipping 48
The immense difficulty of supplying Peruvian markets from Seville led, beginning in the
1530s, to direct trade between the southern viceroyalty and New Spain. At first, commerce
between the two colonies amounted to a handful o f shipments a year with cargoes originating
from Mexico consisting of locally produced foodstuffs and imported merchandise from Spain.
However, following the establishment of civil order in Peru and the discovery of Potosfs
enormous silver deposits in 1545, the market for textiles and other merchandise began to
expand. Despite the newfound wealth of the colony, local production remained inadequate to
meet this growing demand for manufactures. New Spain, with its direct connection to Seville and
its small but growing domestic textile and artisan production thus found itself by the mid 1500s
ideally positioned to supply Peruvian markets.
By 1560, the exchange of Peruvian silver for Mexican and Spanish imports had become
the basis of a commercial relationship that would remain largely unchanged for the next century.
Merchandise exported southward from New Spain included Spanish and Mexican textiles, silk
thread, blankets, leather goods, dyes, furniture, dishes, cups, various toiletry items, metal tools,
jewelry, devotional objects, books, and a host of other wares.49 The majority of these goods were
exchanged for silver, although, small amounts of agricultural goods such as olive oil and wine
were also shipped northward. Commercial traffic between the two viceroyalties remained limited,
however, amounting to perhaps 120,000 to 200,000 pesos a year by the 1560s.50 Although details
for this period remain scarce and further research on inter-Pacific colonial commerce is required,
a small but growing Pacific commercial network was in place prior to the opening of regular
trade between the Americas and Asia in 1571.
48

W oodrow Borah, Early CoIoniaI Trade, 81-82.
49 W oodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 86-87.
50
W oodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 94,
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T h e Birth o f T ranspacific Trade

“Apart from this spur to expansion, there were of course the lure of richesjust over the horizon, the lure offame,
the continuing lure of a way to the Orient.

O.H.K. Spate

As outlined above, Spanish colonization of the New World and the subsequent
development of transadantic and inter-colonial commerce helped to enhance the financial well
being of the Spanish king and deliver substantial commercial profits to the Consulado. The rentseeking approach towards colonial trade and development also ensured that once discovered, the
immense silver reserves o f the New World were quickly exploited and the overwhelming
majority of production funneled directly to Europe. While clearly beneficial to the short-term
finances of both the Crown and Spanish merchants, the rapid growth of the New World mining
industry allowed European merchants, namely the Portuguese, to expand trade with Asia and
insert themselves into lucrative inter-Asian trade circuits.51 In doing so, the velocity and volume
of silver circulating along global trade routes increased, furthering commercial expansion in Asia
and helping to feed the region’s demand for silver. The predominant eastward flow of silver
from the Americas to Europe and then Asia would soon be challenged, however, as Spanish
explorers and colonizers covetously eyed the success of their Portuguese rivals in East Asia.
Despite the distraction that the conquest and establishment of New World colonies
posed to the Crown during the first half of the sixteenth-century, the desire to reach Asia by
sailing west remained. Although Magellan had discovered the Philippines in 1521, the first
attempt to establish a permanent Spanish settlement in the archipelago had failed. Nonetheless,

51 See James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640 (Baltimore, MA: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1993).
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Philip II remained committed to extending Spain’s empire across the Pacific, spreading the
Catholic faith, and pursuing direct access to Asian markets. In 1564 the King ordered Miguel
Lopez de Legaspi to set sail from New Spain bound for the Philippines. On reaching his
destination he was to make a reconnaissance of the islands and establish there a permanent
Spanish settlement. O n the return journey, the king instructed him “to bring [back] some spice,
in order to make an essay of that traffic [and] as much treasure as possible.” 52 Reaching the
Philippines in April of 1565, Legaspi established a settlement on the island of Cebu and from
there continued to survey the archipelago. Two months later he dispatched a ship to New Spain
with a letter informing Philip II that the newly founded Spanish outpost stood “at the gate and in
the vicinity of the most fortunate countries of the world.”53
As of June 1565, no European vessels had crossed the Pacific from the Americas to Asia
and back again. The ship dispatched by Legaspi was therefore tasked with not only relaying the
news of Spain’s newly acquired colony but also discovering an eastward passage from Asia to the
Americas. Guided by Andres de Urdaneta, the San Pedro left the Philippines in a northeasterly
direction and traveled as far north as Japan before heading east at a latitude of 38 degrees north.
Urdaneta believed that by sailing north from the Philippines he could pick up the northern trade
winds of the Pacific and use them to ferry the San Pedro back to the Americas. Although
Urdaneta’s hunch proved to be correct, the eastward crossing of the Northern Pacific was
anything but a straight shot and for over a month and a half the San Pedro ranged between 40
and 30 degrees north before spotting North America in mid- September. From Cape
Mendocino, the vessel followed the North American coastline down to Acapulco, arriving on the
8th of October after a voyage of 130 days and over 12,000 miles.

52 William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 22.
53 Emma Blair and James Robertson, The Philippine Islands 1493 - 1898, Volume II, 226, 214.
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The San Pedro's easterly course across the Pacific quickly became known as TJrdaneta’s
Route’ but it was by no means an easy voyage. Pacific trade winds proved difficult to master;
timing was of the essence, and most trips took an average of six to eight months. Supplies of
food and water often ran dangerously low. Despite the inherent dangers of TJrdaneta’s Route’, it
quickly became the standard course for Manila Galleons making their return trip to the
Americas. Sailing from New Spain to Asia was in contrast a much easier and quicker endeavor
with voyages lasting an average of two months. Ships leaving Acapulco sailed to the southwest
and after reaching 10 degrees north, where the west trade winds could be picked up, made a
more or less straight shot across the Pacific to the Philippines.
While the successful colonization of the Philippines and eastward crossing of the Pacific
laid the foundation for trade between Asia and the Americas, the late 1560s saw little in the way
of profitable, much less substantial, transpacific commerce. At first it was thought that the
islands could be transformed into a major producer of cinnamon, but Legaspi abandoned this
idea by 1568. He reported to Philip II that he doubted the settlement could “be sustained by way
o f [that] trade” and a year later remarked, “the Philippines ought to be considered of litde
importance.”54Juan Pablo Carrion, Legaspi’s admiral, also doubted that the colony would prove
55

profitable unless trade was “opened with China and the rest of the Indies.” At the time, the
Philippines could scarcely be considered a major center of trade in Southeast Asian nor were the
islands overtly rich in spices or other exportable commodities. Native Filipinos, however, had a
long history of regular trade with Chinese and other Asian merchants. Prior to the arrival of the
Spanish, Chinese ceramics, Thai porcelain, decorative beads, and copper gongs and pots among
other items had been imported to the Philippines in exchange for cotton, gold, wax, honey, and
other foodstuffs for centuries. Thus, with the establishment o f a permanent settlement in the

54 Blair and Robertson, Vol. II, “Letters to Felipe II o f Spain,” 241. William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 23.
55 William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 45.
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Philippines, the Spanish successfully inserted themselves into Southeast Asian trade circuits that,
while already undergoing economic expansion, were about to enter a much more rapid period of
development.56
Despite the fact that Legaspi was quick to dismiss the value o f Spain’s newest colonial
settlement, such a view hardly seems to have been shared by colonial merchants in Spanish
America who made their livelihood dealing in overseas imports. In a letter forwarded from
Seville to Miguel Salvador of Valencia and published as a pamphlet in 1566, an unknown author
related the news of Legaspi’s expedition and Urdaneta’s return. In reference to the colonization
of the Philippines and the successful eastward crossing of the Pacific he states, “this is a great
and very important achievement; and the people of Mexico are very proud of their discovery,
which they think will make them the center of the world.”57 It is doubtful that individuals in
Spain took seriously the idea that Mexico could become the “center o f the world”. The fact that
some individuals in the Americas perceived such a development as possible, however, suggests
merchants, at least, saw something momentous in the opening of transpacific trade. It was true
that Urdaneta had returned to Acapulco with only meager amounts of spices, gold, wax and
other articles, which together hardly made for an impressive cargo. Yet the contents of the San
Pedro mattered litde in comparison to the voyage itself. Urdaneta had not simply left the
Americas and sailed to Asia and back, he had expanded the limits of what was possible in the
minds of the colonial merchant community. The chronically under-supplied and increasingly
silver-rich markets of the Americas were now directly linked to “the most fortunate countries of
the world”.

56 ”The entire period 1400-1630 was one o f rapid monetization and commercialization o f the economy,
with the most rapid expansion in the period 1570-1630.” Anthony Reid, Southeast A sia in the Age of Commerce
Vol. 2, 129.
57 Blair and Robertson, Vol. II, “Copy o f a Letter Sent from Sevilla To Miguel Salvador o f Valencia,” 226.
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Early C om m ercial Expansion: 1571 —1586

During the first half-decade of Spanish presence in the Philippines, Legaspi and his
fellow coloni2 ers were under constant threat o f attack from the Portuguese, who sought to
prevent them from gaining a foothold in Asian commerce. Defense therefore remained the
priority, but assessing the possibilities for trade with neighboring Asian states, principally China,
was also a goal during the first years of settlement. In a 1565 letter to the Audiencia of Mexico,
officials in the Philippines asked that large quantities of foodstuffs and military supplies be sent
immediately. Along with theses goods, a substantial number of articles for use in trade, including
“coins and small bars of fine silver for trade with China” were also requested

58

Spanish

knowledge of Asian commerce remained limited at this time. By 1569, however, it was known
that the Portuguese “were trading and bargaining on the coast of China and Japan; and that it
was a business by which they were maintaining themselves, since it was the most extensive and
advantageous trade that has been hitherto seen in any place where trade has been carried on.”

59

The ability of the Spanish to exploit such an advantageous trade for their own benefit would not
begin until the conquest of Luzon and the establishment of Manila as the new seat of
government in 1571. From Manila Bay, the Spanish were able to more easily defend and
consolidate their control over the Philippines, protect against Portuguese attack, and develop a
closer commercial relationship with Chinese merchants.
Once the Spanish presence in Manila was secure, regular trade with the Chinese quickly
developed. By 1573, one Guido de Lavezaris reported to Philip II, “the Chinese have come here
[to Manila] on trading expeditions, since our arrival [and]...in greater numbers each year, and with
more ships.” Although an increasing number of Chinese merchants were sailing to Manila, they
58 Blair and Robertson, Vol. II, “Letter from the royal officials o f the Filipinas to the Royal Audiencia at
Mexico,” 183-195.
59 Blair and Robertson, Vol. II, 'Letter from Andres de Mirandola to Felipe II,” 20.
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had yet to bring the finer merchandise that they had to offer, indicating to Lavezaris “that, if
there were any one to buy them, they would bring all we wanted.” Quickly finding the Spanish to
be eager consumers, these traders began to diversify their cargo, bringing “each year better and
richer wares.”60 According to the government notary Hernando Requel, the Chinese “brought
specimens o f many kinds o f goods peculiar to their country, in order to arrange prices at which
they can be sold —such as quicksilver, [gun] powder, pepper, fine cinnamon, cloves, sugar, iron,
copper, tin, brass, silks [and] textiles of many kinds.. .various kinds of crockery...and a thousand
o f other goods and trifles quite as many as the Flemings bring.”61 It did not take long for
substantial quantities o f such goods to arrive in the Americas. In December of 1573, the viceroy
of New Spain welcomed a ship from Manila containing “one hundred and thirty-six marcos of
gold.. .jewels.. .two hundred and eighty quintals o f cinnamon [acquired from the island of
M indanao].. .silks of different colors (both damasks and satins), clothstuffs, and a lot of cotton
m antles.. .a quantity of wax, glazed earthenware; and other knick-knacks such as fans, parasols,
desks, and numberless other little manufactured articles.” 62 Included in this shipment were
22,000 pieces o f Chinese porcelain.63
In the words of Pierre Chaunu, “the extraordinary luck of the Spanish Philippines was to
be at the point of contact between two monetary systems, a world of dear silver and a world of
cheap silver.”64 By the mid 1570s, the basic structure of transpacific trade was in place. Manila
was the main commercial center of the Philippines and the principal link between the economies
o f Asia and the Americas. Over a dozen junks sailed annually from Fuijian province in southern
China to Manila, leading to an increase in the size of the Chinese community residing in the
50 Blair and Robertson, Vol. Ill, “Affairs in the Philippines After the Death o f Legazpi,” 160.
61 Blair and Robertson, Vol. Ill, “News from the Western Islands by Hernando Riquel and Others,” 219.
62 Blair and Robertson, Vol. Ill, “Letter from the Viceroy o f New Spain to Felipe II,”192.
63 Luke Clossey, “Merchants, Migrants, Missionaries, and Globalization in the Early-Modern Pacific,”
Journal of Global History 1 (2006): 42.
64 Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Iberiques, 458, quoted in O.H.K. Spate, The Pacific Since
Magellan, 161.
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Spanish colonial capital. As a result, the markets of Manila were reportedly well stocked, with
buyers able to find “everything in the same abundance as in Espana,” N ot only was the variety of
goods available in the Philippines equal to that of Europe but, because of the high value of silver
in China, “the prices of everything [the Chinese bring is] so moderate, that they are to be had
almost for nothing.”65 While the exact quantity and type of goods imported from Asia to the
New World throughout the late sixteenth century is unknown, Antonio de Morga provided a
substantial list o f wares available for purchase in Spanish Manila in his 1609 History of the
Philippine Islands,66
The merchandise that they [the Chinese] generally bring and sell to the
Spaniards consists of raw silk in bundles, of the fineness o f two strands [dos
mbefas], and other silk o f poorer quality; fine untwisted silk, white and o f all
colors, wound in small skeins; quantities of velvets, some plain, and some
embroidered in all sorts of figures, colors, and fashions— others with body of
gold, and embroidered with gold; woven stuffs and brocades, of gold and silver
upon silk of various colors and patterns; quantities of gold and silver thread in
skeins over thread and silk.. .damasks, satins, taffetans, gorvaranes, pzcotes, and
other cloths of all colors, some finer and better than others;.. .and white cotton
cloth of different kinds and qualities, for all uses. They also bring musk,
benzoin, and ivory; many bed ornaments, hangings, coverlets, and tapestries of
embroidered velvet; damask and gorvaran of different shades; tablecloths,
cushions, and carpets; horse-trappings of the same stuff, and embroidered with
glass beads and seed-pearls; also some pearls and rubies, sapphires and crystalstones; metal basins, copper ketdes, and other copper and cast-iron pots;

65 Blair and Robertson, Vol. Ill, 272.
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quantities of all sorts of nails, sheet-iron, tin and lead; saltpetre and gunpowder.
They supply the Spaniards with wheat flour; preserves made of orange, peach,
scor^onera, pear, nutmeg, and ginger, and other fruits of China; salt pork and
other salt meats; live fowls of good breed, and very fine capons; quantities of
green fruit, oranges of all kinds; excellent chestnuts, walnuts, pears, and chicueyes
(both green and dried, a delicious fruit); quantities o f fine thread of all kinds,
needles, and knick-knacks; little boxes and writing-cases; beds, tables, chairs,
and gilded benches, painted in many figures and patterns.. ..The Chinese furnish
numberless other gewgaws and ornaments of little value and worth, which are
esteemed among the Spaniards; besides a quantity of fine crockery of all kinds;
canganes, sines, and black and blue robes; tacley, which are beads of all kinds;
strings o f cornelians, and other beads and precious stones of all colors; pepper
and other spices; and rarities— which, did I refer to them all, I would never
finish, nor have sufficient paper for it. 67

The variety of merchandise available for purchase and advantageous commercial climate
o f the Philippines during the 1570s prompted some colonial officials to advocate for an increase
in the number of ships available for use in transpacific trade and an expansion of Spanish
commerce throughout Southeast Asia. From Manila, Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Penalosa
requested that Philip II command that ships from New Spain be dispatched with greater
frequency and raised the possibility of expanding transpacific trade to Asian ports outside of the
Philippines. Ronquillo de Penalosa advocated specifically for the development of trade between
the Island o f Maluccas and the Americas. He noted to the king that Manila Galleons ferrying
various spices could “touch at Nueva Espana and leave there the amount necessary for that
67 Blair and Robertson, Vol. 16, 232-237.
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kingdom, and in Panama, what is needed for Pirn, the kingdom of Tierra Firme and the new
kingdom of Granada.” N ot content with supplying colonial markets, Penalosa pointed out that
from Panama Asian spices could easily be re-exported to Spain.68
Governor Penalosa believed that an expansion of transpacific trade would prove
extremely beneficial for Spain’s colonies in the New World on account of Spanish Manila’s close
“proximity to China [which was] without d oubt.. .the finest country in the world, since it has so
many people and so great wealth.”69 Acting on this belief, the governor dispatched several ships
directly to Panama and Peru in the early 1580s. Permission for limited trade between the
Philippines and ports of Peru, Guatemala and Tierra Firme (the Isthmus of Panama) was granted
in 1579, leading to the first direct shipment of goods between Manila and Peru two years later.70
A second ship loaded with artillery and other merchandise set off for the viceroyalty in 1582,
followed in 1583 by a vessel bound directly for Panama that sailed on account of “private
individuals.”71
The opening years of the 1580s thus found transpacific commerce expanding both in
value and volume as direct trade between Manila and ports throughout Spanish America was
being established. The increasing availability o f comparatively lower-priced Asian goods in New
Spain led to an expansion in inter-Pacific colonial trade to Peru, where silver production was
spiking. Hard data on this commerce is limited but Woodrow Borah estimates that trade
amounted to 100,000-120,000 pesos a year in the early 1560s, exceeded 200,000 pesos by the
opening of the 1570s, and reached a total of over two million pesos annually in the 1590s.72

68 Blair and Robertson, Vol. IV , “Letter from Gonzalo Ronquillo de Penalosa to Felipe II,” 43-45.
69 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V , “Letter from Penalosa to Felipe II,” 19.
70 William Schurz, “Mexico, Peru, and the Manila Galleon,” 395.
71 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V , “Letter from Penalosa to Felipe II,” 24.
72 W oodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 94-95.
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Harry E. Cross provides similar figures for the 1590s and estimates that two to three million
pesos flowed from Peru to New Spain annually.

73

Whatever the overall value of commerce between New Spain and Peru was, colonial
merchants were clearly making sizeable profits by re-exporting Asian goods from Acapulco to
Lima and other Peruvian markets such as Potosi. One Diego Lopez de Toledo, a small time
Peruvian merchant in the 1560s had, by the mid 1580s, acquired his own ship and was making
100,000 pesos a year by importing merchandise from Mexico. Woodrow Borah argues that
increasing sums of capital seemed to have been invested in Pacific commerce at this time, an
indication that more and more merchants were turning away from the trade in Sevillean imports
at Veracruz and Panama City.74 Evidendy, commercial profits in the Philippines circa 1583 were
also healthy enough for Governor Penalosa to raise duties on both imported and exported goods
with littie protest from Chinese or Spanish merchants. As indicated above, Penalosa emerges
from the documentary sources as being a key promoter of transpacific commerce during these
early years, taking it upon himself to actively develop commercial routes. His zeal for expanding
commerce can be clearly seen in a 1583 letter to Philip II when he promised to send further
ships to all of “the principal kingdoms held by your Majesty in the Indias and the Southern Sea.”
75

While Penalosa worked to expand commerce from his post in Manila, other servants of
the Crown were beginning to raise alarm over the growing volume of Chinese goods available in
colonial markets and the increasing drain o f silver to Asia. The Peruvian viceroy Martin
Enriquez, who had welcomed the first Manila Galleons to Acapulco a decade earlier, was one
early antagonist of transpacific trade. In a 1583 letter to Philip II he voiced alarm over the
introduction of lower-priced Chinese goods to Peru. Enriquez specifically feared that the further
73 Harry E. Cross, “South American Bullion Production and Export, 1550-1750,” 412.
74 W oodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 94-95.
75 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V , “Letter from Penalosa to Felipe II,” 24.
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importation of Chinese silks would threaten the sale of Spanish textiles. He went on to inform
the king that the vessel dispatched by Penalosa in 1582 had brought to Peru a number of goods
including Chinese porcelain, iron, spices, wax, and various textiles. This, Enriquez pointed out,
was a clear violation of existing commercial regulation forbidding the direct importation of Asian
merchandise to Peru.76 Phillip IPs cedula o f 1579, which had permitted direct trade between
Manila and American ports outside of Acapulco, had stipulated that only military supplies could
be imported directly from Asia. Furthermore, this limited trade concession had been made in
light of recent attacks on Spanish colonial ports and shipping lanes by Francis Drake. Its
purpose, therefore, was to allow for the armament and fortification of Spain’s American colonies
rather than to offer a royal blessing for the expansion of commerce between Asia and the New
World.
The potential danger to merchant and royal finances that an expansion of transpacific
trade posed was not lost on the Philip II. Having united the crowns of Portugal and Spain some
three years earlier, he now ruled over a truly global empire. Although he remained focused
primarily on imperial ambitions in Europe, the king was a consummate ruler who readily
consumed the voluminous reports pouring in from distant regions of his empire. Philip II
monitored royal finances with equal vigor and therefore understood the importance of the
Consulado’s monopoly over colonial markets and the general flow of New World silver to
Spain.

77

While the promise of Asian riches had driven the king to establish a colony in the

Philippines only two decades earlier, commerce between the New World and China was quickly
developing into a potential threat to Crown finances. As a result of Enriquez’s reports and
G overnor Penalosa’s promise to dispatch ships to all of Spain’s “principal kingdoms.. .in the
Indias,” Philip II banned both the sale of Asian goods in Peruvian markets and further voyages

76 William Schurz, “Mexico, Peru, and the Manila Galleon,” 396, Footnote 34.
77 See Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II.
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between Manila and Peru.78 While the markets of New Spain were larger than that of Peru, it was
the southern viceroyalty that accounted for the majority New World silver production
throughout the sixteenth-century. As a result, while the number of consumers in Peru was
smaller in comparison to New Spain, they had access to larger supplies of bullion and a capacity
for import consumption that contemporaries described as excessive and luxurious. It is therefore
unsurprising that Philip IPs first decree regulating the Manila Gallon trade network was designed
to safeguard the Consulado’s monopoly over Peruvian markets.
Following the king’s ban, even more sobering news concerning transpacific trade
reached Spain. In 1584, one Melchior Davalos informed Philip II that over four thousand
Chinese resided in Manila and despite “laws forbidding any one to take money out of your
realm s.. .every year [they] take away all the money there is .. .as we have no merchandise to give
them, having nothing except reals.”79 Spanish merchants in the Philippines had known from the
earliest years of transpacific trade that any “commerce with [China] must be carried on with
silver, which [the Chinese] value above all other things.”

80

What had begun as a trickle in the

early 1570s was, by the mid 1580s, a steady and growing stream of wealth.
Gauging the precise value of transpacific trade at this time is difficult, but in 1586 one
Pedro Rojas estimated that three to five hundred thousand pesos flowed annually to China.
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These figures seem conservative given the fact that a year later a returning galleon, the Santa Ana,
carried cargo that, according to the Manila Audiencia, “would have been worth in Mexico two
million [pesos].” 82 Furthermore, despite the king’s recent ban on sales of Asian goods in Peru,
the inter-Pacific trade in these commodities continued to flourish throughout the 1580s. Again,
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hard data regarding the value or scope of this commercial activity remains scarce due to a lack of
scholarly attention but Woodrow Borah estimated that by the early 1590s it may have amounted
to over two million pesos a year with Asian imports accounting for the vast majority of goods
being shipped to Peru.83
Spanish citizens o f Manila were also expressing their concern to Philip II over the
expansion of transpacific trade at this time. A general assembly was called in the spring of 1586
and a long list of grievances drawn up and dispatched to Madrid. Chapter three o f this
memorandum was dedicated to matters of commerce and opened with a request to Philip II that
he forbid consignments of silver from being sent from New Spain to the Philippines. According
to the assembly, merchants from Mexico arrived each year with such large supplies of silver that
they were able to outbid the Spanish citizens of Manila and buy up the majority of Asian goods.
As a result, Mexican trading companies were in control of transpacific commerce and a large
amount of silver was lost to China each year. Both outcomes, the assembly believed, were
detrimental to the well being of Philippines and the interests of the Consulado. To remedy this
situation, the assembly requested “that only the citizens of these islands be allowed to buy and
export to Mexico the products of this land and foreign products [and that] if any other person
wish to do this, he should be obliged to become a citizen and reside here at least for three years;
and he should trade with none but his own property.” 84
The Cabildo of Manila endorsed these proposed measures, telling the king, “we are
being totally ruined here through the arrival in this city of merchants, and consignments from
Mexico.” These officials went on to warn that as a result of this, “the customs duties of Sevilla
and o f Vera Cruz are being decreased and lost, to the great detriment of [Sevillean]
m erchants.. .the royal customs duties are being decreased [and] silver is taken to a country of

83 W oodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 94-95.
84 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V I, “Memorial to the Council by Citizens o f the Filipinas Islands,” 157.
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infidels.” Together, the cabildo and the general assembly argued that by restricting trade with
Chinese merchants to legal citizens of Manila, transpacific commerce could be limited to “small
am ounts.. .[and the] resultant loss to this state and to the seigniories of [Philip II]” would come
to an end.

85

Obviously, individuals in Manila were not concerned entirely with the commercial

well being of the Consulado or even the king’s finances.86Any decrease in the role of Mexican
merchants would entail a corresponding increase in their control of transpacific trade and with it,
commercial profits.
Despite the fact that individuals in the Philippines were acting largely with their own
interests in mind, they seem to have been genuinely concerned with the drain of silver to Asia.
Rather than request a ban on transpacific commerce they advocated for a more limited trade
between Manila and the Americas in locally produced goods. Cotton, wax, honey, and gold for
example, were singled out as Filipino products that could be exported to the New World in place
of Asian imports. Even if such goods were exchanged primarily for American silver, Spanish
officials and citizens argued that the bullion would remain in the Philippines, as opposed to
being shipped to China, and would thereby help to increase the wealth of the colony.
In a letter accompanying both the cabildo’s and the assembly’s dispatches, Pedro Rojas
argued that the highly profitable trade with China was actually inhibiting the economic
development of the Philippines. Due to the abundance of American silver and lower priced
Asian goods, native Filipinos no longer produced “cloths, lampotes [cotton gauze], cotton, and
gold, all of which have great value in Nueva Espana.” If commerce with China was curtailed,
Rojas believed that local production would resume and “the articles sent from Espana to Nueva
Espana would keep their value [due to the absence of Asian imports] and the gold and silver paid

85 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V I, “Letter from the Manila Cabildo to Felipe II,” 242.
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for them would remain in [Philip II’s] realm.” Rojas further stated, “it would be of great
importance to your Majesty and the whole country.. .if [Filipino goods] alone formed the
merchandise sent to Nueva Espana from these islands, the gold and silver would remain here,
and in the hands of the Spaniards themselves.”87 Although this economic policy sounds
implausible, the argument that New World bullion would remain in the Philippines if commerce
with China were suppressed spoke directly to Philip II and the Consulado’s concerns over
transpacific trade.
As warnings over the drain of silver to Asia and the continued importation of Chinese
wares to the New World reached Madrid, government officials presented Philip II in 1586 with a
report detailing the threat posed by transpacific trade. According to these officials, lower-priced
wares from the Philippines readily undersold Spanish imports in American markets.

88

As a result,

“trade in fabrics imported from these kingdoms [Spain] to that land [the New World] is steadily
decreasing, on account of the trade which is carried on there with the Philippine Islands.” As a
consequence, large amounts o f silver were lost to Asia and “the commerce o f these kingdoms
[Spain] is falling away, and the bringing of money hither is impeded [because] the lure o f the
cheapness of the [Chinese] merchandise overcomes all considerations.” In terms of future action
in regards to transpacific commerce, they advised Philip II that “the trade and commerce o f the
said islands, as far as said merchandise is concerned, should be abolished, and that these wares
should not be carried to Nueva Espana or other parts of the Indias, in order that the trade of
these kingdoms —a most important matter —may continue.” 89
Philip II wasted little time in following through on the recommendations of his officials.
87 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V I, “Letter o f Pedro Rojas to Felipe II,” 265.
88 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V I, “Measures Regarding Trade with China,” 279. There is a strong focus in
this report on the underselling o f Spanish textiles by Chinese imports however, it is clear that Spanish
officials are not only talking about Chinese silk. “He [Viceroy Enriquez] says, moreover, that all goods
carried from the islands are mere trifles, from which the land derives no profit —such as porcelains,
escritoires, caskets, fans, and parasols.”
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In 1586, all trade between the Philippines and China was suspended indefinitely and the selling
of imported Chinese wares in American markets forbidden. By the mid 1580s, trade between the
New World and China had come to be perceived as a serious threat to the Consulado’s control
over Spanish. American markets and with it, Crown finances. As a result, Philip II chose to ban
all commerce between China and Manila. In a written response to the king, however, Viceroy
Villamanrrique of New Spain downplayed the value of the Manila Galleon trade. He called the
“silk, both raw and woven, cotton cloth, iron, copper, earthenware, and other things of no great
worth” that are shipped from Manila a mere “annoyance.” He went on to argue that the end of
trade with China would curtail the spread of Catholicism, result in the eventual loss of the
Philippines, and bring about a decline of Spain’s power in Asia. Having made his case for
continuing transpacific commerce, Villamanrrique closed his letter by stating “I have seen fit to
disregard your Majesty’s orders” concerning further trade with China.90 The viceroy was not
alone in his refusal to enforce Philip II’s ban and the royal cedula of 1586 became a dead letter
upon its arrival.
Although Villamanrrique may have been sincere in regards to continuing the spread of
Catholicism and Spain’s power in Asia, it is clear that the value of New Spain’s trade with Manila
shaped his decision to ignore the king’s order. Villamanrrique had admitted as much to Philip II
earlier in 1586 when he reveled in a letter that the re-export of Asian goods to Peru “had become
a very important part o f Mexican trade.” The viceroy’s seemingly cavalier dismissal of royal
orders is hardly surprising. Despite the 1582 ban on the shipment of Asian wares to Peru, he and
other officials had not only had allowed the trade to continue but saw to it that said goods were
officially registered and taxed in both New Spain and Peru. 91

90 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V I, “Letter from Marques de Villamanrrique to Felipe II,” 280-289.
91 W oodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 119.

49
For Philip II, controlling, let alone suspending transpacific trade would prove most
difficult. Doing so required surmounting the standard obstacles of distance, time and imperfect
information that rulers of the period faced when governing over large imperial domains. Philip II
was not only forced to grapple with these issues on a global scale but at a time of increasing
interconnectedness and interdependency. To safeguard the Consulado’s control over colonial
markets and the flow of large silver remittances to Spain he had to prevent New World bullion
from being exchanged for Asian merchandise. The rapid development of transpacific trade in the
1570s and 1580s, however, impacted not just Spanish imperial policy but global trade routes as
well.

C om m ercial E xp an sion and Rivalry

As the first decade and a half of transpacific commerce came to a close, the trade in
Asian wares and New World silver had come to exercise a significant impact on the regional
economies and merchant communities of both Asia and the Americas. As discussed above, the
high value of silver in China and demand for imports in Spanish America caused an increasing
sum of New World mining production to gravitate towards Manila. Asian and European
merchants quickly followed suit, seeking to settle or establish factors in the Spanish colonial
capital. The emergence of Spanish Manila as a commercial entrepot in the 1580s marked a shift
in regional and global trade patterns. At the same time, the Manila Galleon trade network altered
patterns of consumption and production throughout the Pacific Rim.
Prior to the opening of transpacific trade, Chinese merchants were involved in foreign
commerce primarily as a means to acquire silver. As a result, production in the southern coastal
provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang was heavily oriented towards foreign markets by
the late 1500s. While the New World represented only one of several export markets for Chinese
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goods, trade between China and Manila grew considerably in the 1570s. By the early 1580s,
James Boyajian argues that “more silver was reaching China via the Pacific from Peru than from
i

.

any other single source.”

99

In Manila, New World silver was exchanged for a variety of goods, including Chinese
ceramics. At this time, increasing quantities of lower priced, mass-produced ceramics and finer
porcelain pieces were becoming available to consumers in Spanish American markets. While the
majority of these pieces were decorated with traditional Chinese motifs, Chinese producers also
copied Western designs and even accepted custom orders from European merchants. Shortly
after the Spanish consolidated their presence in the Philippines, Chinese ceramic and glass pieces
decorated with Philip II’s coat of arms began to appear.93 Whether bearing Chinese or European
designs, these goods were readily bought by colonial consumers and influenced local artisans
throughout the Americas. N ot only did Chinese ceramics represent valuable commodities, they
frequently served as convenient ballast for Manila Galleons.
The export of silk thread and cloth, driven partly by the Single Whip reform of 1581,
was also a burgeoning rural industry along the Chinese coast that saw an increasing volume of its
production shipped across the Pacific. Like ceramics, Chinese textiles were exported throughout
Asia, as well as Europe and parts o f Africa. The expansion o f transpacific trade in the late 1500s,
however, quickly transformed Manila into one of the principal destinations for Chinese silks.94
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The Portuguese merchant and economic writer Duarte Gomes Solis reflected in 1622 that
demand for Chinese textiles at Manila caused the price of silk to rise in China.95
Like Spain’s Philip II, China’s Ming emperors sought to exercise as much control over
foreign commerce as possible. Merchants in China were forced to acquire a government license
before conducting trade with foreign states. Following the Spanish conquest of Manila Bay,
Chinese merchants called for an increase in the number of government licenses available for
trade with the Philippines. In 1589, the Ming government conceded to the merchants’ demands
by creating a new regulatory system and awarding a substantial number of foreign trade licenses
to merchants going to Spanish Manila. According to Richard von Glahn, out of a total of 88, “by
far the largest number —16 —was reserved for Luzon (as many as Batavia, Siam, Palembang, and
Cochin combined; no other destination was allotted more than 2 licenses).” 96 Therefore, by the
late 1500s the Philippines had emerged as a major, if not one of the most prominent foreign
destinations for Chinese merchants.
Chinese traders were not alone in being drawn to Manila in the 1580s. Portuguese
merchants based in Macao in southern China were also busy trying to establish themselves in the
Philippines. Like their Chinese counterparts, these merchants sought to acquire supplies of silver
in order to expand their inter-Asian commercial dealings. While the Portuguese shipment of
Asian commodities to Europe via the Cape Route, known as the Carreira trade, was extremely
profitable, the value and volume o f goods traded within Asia by Portuguese merchants, or
casados, dwarfed that of the former. Since the first decades o f the 1500s, Portuguese merchants
had conducted trade with China, Japan, and other East Asian states independent of the Crowncontrolled Estado da India. Referred to as the casado trade, recent scholarship has shown that
Portuguese merchants in Asia concerned themselves primarily with Asian commerce as opposed
95 Duarte Gomes Solis, Discursos sobre los comercios de las dos Indias, ed. Moses Bensabat Amzalak (Lisbon:
1943), 67.
96 Richard von Glahn, fountain ojFortune, 118-119.
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to the importation of Asian wares to Europe.97 In East Asia, the highly profitable casado trade
centered on Macao, a small island in the Pearl River delta region of southern China. From this
location, Portuguese merchants were able to reap enormous commercial profits by exchanging
Chinese silk and gold for Japanese silver. Following the Ming dynasty’s ban on direct foreign
trade with Japan in 1567, the Portuguese enjoyed a near monopoly over the importation of
Japanese silver to China.
Spanish colonization of the Philippines and the beginning of transpacific trade in the
1570s was greeted with hostility in Macao because it threatened the Portuguese commercial
position in terms of both inter-Asian trade circuits and, to a lesser extent, the importation of
Asian commodities to Europe. Following their failed attempts to expel the Spanish by force
from Manila and the Philippines in general, the Portuguese lobbied Ming officials and requested
that they deny Spanish merchants the right to trade directly with China. The union o f Portugal
and Spain under Philip II in 1580, however, complicated the Portuguese-Spanish commercial
rivalry in East Asia. As already noted, this union created a truly global empire. As a result, Philip
II not only controlled kingdoms, colonies, and commercial outposts throughout Europe, Africa,
Asia, and the New World, he also held a dominant position over long-distance commercial trade
in the Adantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. The Spanish-Portuguese Empire, however, was not
perfectly unified. Rather than a fusion o f the two empires, the Iberian union constituted little
more than a uniting of Spain and Portugal under one ruler. While the two may have shared
enemies and foreign policy after 1580, Portugal remained a distinct political unit within the larger
Spanish imperial framework. In practice, this meant that despite pledging allegiance to Philip II,
Portugal retained control over its internal governance like the kingdom of Aragon and the city of
Barcelona, as well as its foreign commerce.

97 James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in A sia under the Habsburgs, 53.
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In terms of global trade patterns, Philip II sought to safeguard the commercial interests
of merchants in both Seville and Lisbon within the larger Spanish-Portuguese Empire. The
purpose o f this policy was to preserve the respective commercial monopoly of each group and
thereby guarantee two reliable income streams for the Crown. The goal of Philip’s commercial
policy was for the Consulado to continue to extract high profit margins from trade with the New
World while Lisbon merchants maintained control over the slave trade in the Adantic and
commerce with Asia via the Cape route. While dealing in African slaves delivered large profits to
Portuguese merchants, Portuguese trade with Asia constituted the main source of royal income.
This revenue stream was based on import taxes levied on Asian goods and the royal monopoly
on pepper. Rather than manage Asian commerce direcdy or create a legal institution like the
Consulado, the king of Portugal had granted limited contracts to consortiums o f private
merchants. These merchants managed trade with Asia and imported pepper on the king’s
account. Each year, profits from the sale of pepper were delivered directly to the king of
Portugal, leaving merchants to reap profits from the sale o f all other imported goods minus the
royal import tax. 98
Upon assuming the throne of Portugal, Philip II showed little interest in altering existing
trade with Asia. The practice of granting contracts to consortiums of Portuguese merchants
continued, providing Philip II with a second, albeit limited stream of income to further his
imperial designs in E urope." Following the union, the Portuguese at Macao were quick to lobby
their new sovereign to safeguard their commercial position in Asia. They requested specifically
that Philip II prohibit further efforts by Spanish officials in Manila to expand political and
commercial ties with China. 100 At the same time, however, Portuguese merchants sought to

98 For an excellent overview o f Portuguese trade in Asia before and throughout the Iberian union, see
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establish trade with Manila and even sought to draw Manila Galleons loaded with New World
silver to Macao. Despite failing to secure direct trade between Macao and the New World,
Portuguese traders succeeded in augmenting the supply of silver for use in inter-Asian trade by
contact with Manila. This in turn enabled the Portuguese to acquire more Asian wares for export
to Europe.101 Although Portuguese merchants in Macao sought to establish trade with both
Manila and the New World during the 1580s, they were operating largely outside the control of
the Estado da India and the regulations governing Portuguese trade in Asia. Like the Consulado,
Portuguese merchants in Lisbon viewed the emergence of the Manila Galleon trade network as a
growing threat to their commercial interests in Asia.
Across the Pacific, the development of transpacific trade was having a similar impact on
the economies and merchant communities of the New World. For one, the commerce served as
a stimulant to colonial industries such as silk weaving in New Spain. As Woodrow Borah showed
in his classic 1943 study, prior to the establishment o f Manila, Mexican sericulture had been
unable to meet the demand of local silk guilds for thread. After 1579 large supplies of silk thread
and dyes from China began to arrive, leading to an increase in silk textile production.

102

Colonial

shipbuilding was likewise stimulated by transpacific trade, as it increased the demand for vessels
to both ply the Pacific and the coastal trade routes connecting Mexico and the markets of
Central and South America.
As noted already, imported Asian merchandise helped to fill the growing consumer
demand for manufactures throughout Spanish America. This not only disrupted the Consulado’s
monopolistic control over colonial markets but also sparked a bitter feud between colonial
merchants in New Spain and Peru. The main point of contention between Mexican and Peruvian
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merchants was who would supply South American markets. While the markets of Mexico and
Central America had always demanded larger supplies of imported goods than the Consulado
shipped, Peru had remained by far the most under-stocked. Its consumers were, by the last third
o f the sixteenth-century, also becoming unrivaled in their taste for and capacity to consume
manufactures and luxury wares. By the 1580s, imported Asian goods were widely available on the
Calle de Mercaderes in Lima, where, according to Viceroy Monterrey “people live most
luxuriously.” 103 Francesco Carletti also observed the consumption patterns of Peruvians during
his visit to Lima in the 1590s. There he noted, “many household of important Spanish gentlemen
and merchants [who] live with more cleanliness and splendor than in any other part of the West
Indies.” Carletti, however, observed not only wealthy Peruvians living luxuriously, but African
slaves as well, who “on festive days.. .go about superbly dressed in silk and with pearls, and even
gold.” 104 The heralded buying power of Peruvians was still evident in the 1620s when the
governor of the Philippines estimated that the viceroyalty could absorb two million pesos’ worth
o f Chinese textiles a year.105
Following the end of Penalosa’s short-lived expansion o f transpacific commercial
routes, Acapulco emerged as the main theatre where the Mexican-Peruvian rivalry was to play
out. While merchants from New Spain possessed the advantage of a strong and direct
commercial link to Manila, their Peruvian counterparts had access to larger supplies of capital
due to the immense silver output of Potosi. As a result, Peruvian merchants were frequently able
to outbid their Mexican rivals at Acapulco and carry away a large share of Asian imports.106 Once
again, Francesco Carletti’s experience of arriving to Acapulco in the mid-1590s testifies to this.
Having sold his merchandise in Lima for bars of silver, the Florentine sailed to New Spain where
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he hoped to exchange the silver for goods that could be re-exported to Peru. After arriving, he
noted how local “women of the world” had a saying to the effect of “let the jinens out and the
sancudos in [which] refers to the Peruvians, almost as if to say; ‘Get out, you small-town folk and
rustics. People weightier and more splendid than you are coming.’ And in fact that is what
happens, because o f the quantities of silver which the Peruvians bring to buy various goods.”

107

New Christian Portuguese merchants were also active in transpacific and inter-colonial
trade networks throughout the 1580s, and constituted a small but well-connected and wellfinanced rival faction to Peruvian and Mexican traders. Following the union o f Spain and
Portugal, small communities of New Christian Portuguese merchants began to appear in Manila
and major trade centers throughout the New World. With their commercial and familial
networks that literally encircled the globe, these merchants were able to profitably trade in
standard global commodities such as silk and spices along with small, niche luxury items like
diamonds, pearls, and colored gemstones. Like all New Christian merchants, those operating out
o f Spanish-controlled territories throughout this period lived a precarious existence and were
under the near-constant threat o f prosecution by the Inquisition. Nonetheless, these merchants
imported millions of pesos’ worth of Asian wares to the New World and distributed them via
colonial trade circuits.
As the efforts of both European and Asian merchants demonstrate, the decade and half
following the establishment of Spanish Manila witnessed quantitative and qualitative changes in
Southeast Asian and Spanish American trade routes. The demand for New World silver drove
increasing number of Chinese and Portuguese traders to the Philippines. Colonial and, to a lesser
extent, New Christian Portuguese merchants in turn converged on both Spanish Manila and
Acapulco in order to satisfy the appetite Spanish American consumers for imported
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commodities. Although significant, the expansion of transpacific commerce during this period
only laid the foundation for further development in the coming decades.

G alleons in a Silver Sink: 1586 - 1604

‘The King of China could build a palace with the silver barsfrom Peru which have been carried to his country '
because of that traffic, without their having been registered, and without the King of Espana having beenpaid his
duties. ”—from The Relation ofHieronimo de Banuelosy Carrillo, 1638.108

With the king’s cedula banning trade between the Philippines and China being ignored,
Manila Galleons continued to ply the Pacific after 1586. Like the first decade and half following
the establishment of Spanish Manila, the waning years of the sixteenth-century witnessed various
groups and individuals trying to augment the number of commercial routes and vessels involved
in transpacific trade. But while some merchants and government officials promoted the
expansion of the Manila Galleon trade network, the Consulado and, by the late 1580s, the
Portuguese called increasingly for its suppression. As the overall value of the trade increased
throughout the late 1580s and 1590s, the pressure on Philip II, and later Philip III, to stem the
loss of silver to China and the flow of Asian merchandise to colonial markets continued to
mount.
Following his refusal to enforce the king’s 1586 decree, Viceroy Villamanrrique of New
Spain worked earnestly to increase the number of vessels completing annually voyages to and
from the Philippines. In his dispatches to Madrid, the Mexican viceroy communicated his efforts
to foster the development of a privately owned, transpacific commercial fleet for the benefit of
the Crown. Writing in 1587, the Viceroy told Philip II, that it is “very im portant.. .for your
108 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X X IV , “The Relation of Hieronimo de Banuelos y Carrillo,” 71.
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Majesty’s service that trading in the Philipinas should be carried on through the hands of the
merchants; that they should maintain ships, in order to relieve your Majesty from so great and
heavy expense as you are under.” To this end, the Viceroy had begun to auction off royally
owned vessels to private individuals who promised to keep them involved in trade with Asia “as
long as [they] hold together.” He also suggested to Philip II that the Crown could net a si2 eable
profit by building and selling galleons to colonial merchants in New Spain. Both the selling of
existing ships and construction of new ones were part of Villamanrrique’s overall designs for an
expanded transpacific commercial space dominated by private merchants from New Spain. The
viceroy believed that by encouraging the development of private transpacific commerce,
“conditions [in the Pacific] will finally come to be like those in the Northern Sea [the Atlantic].”
109

New Spain was not the only Spanish colony to see an increase in shipbuilding as a result
o f the expansion of transpacific trade in the late 1580s. In the Philippines, Governor Santiago de
Vera was, like his counterpart in New Spain, overseeing the construction of Manila Galleons. As
o f June 1587, Vera reported that “a fine galley o f five hundred toneladas” was complete which
raised the number of ships in the Philippines suitable for transpacific crossings to five. Vera
informed the King, “trade continues to increase, so that, were vessels not lacking, a great
quantity o f goods would be sent to Nueva Espana.” In the same letter, Vera requested additional
funds to cover the construction and outfitting of ships for coastal defense and trade with New
Spain. Vera was quick to note that vessels “can be constructed very easily, and at but a little
expense” in Manila.110 The Manila suburb o f Cavite would in fact become a major center of
shipbuilding in the coming decades and would soon turn out galleons well in excess of 1000
tons’ burden.
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While the addition of new galleons and development of private shipping in the Pacific
helped to further commerce, merchants and government officials also pushed to establish direct
trade routes between China and the New World. With the approval of Villamanrrique, both the
San Martin and the Santa A.na sailed from Acapulco to Macao in 1587 and 1588.'11 A year later,
the ban on direct trade between Peru and Asia may have been flouted when “a ship from
Panama or Piru, prepared to lay out a large sum of money, arrived at Macao.”
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Spanish

merchants were not the only ones bypassing Manila at this time. In both 1584 and 1589
Portuguese vessels set out from Macao bound for New Spain. Upon arrival at Acapulco, the
captain of the 1589 voyage Joao da Gama, was immediately detained and had his sizeable cargo
o f merchandize confiscated by Mexican authorities. Despite the loss of its captain, the
Portuguese vessel completed its return to Macao successfully and netted a sizeable profit thanks
to American silver. 113
Although Macao remained a Portuguese trading post throughout the union of Portugal
and Spain, there is reason to suspect that a small number of Spanish merchants may have
established themselves on the island by the late 1580s. In 1589, the Portuguese viceroy o f India
Manuel de Sousa Coutinho wrote to Philip II concerning the continued violation of the ban on
trade between China and New Spain. Singling out Portuguese officials in Macao for aiding this
commerce, Coutinho informed the king that he had dispatched troops and ordered the expulsion
of Spanish merchants from the outpost. This, he told his sovereign, would ensure “that only the
original Portuguese citizens shall remain in Machao [and] will do away with any further occasion
for vessels to go there from Nueva Espana.” 114
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The push by Spanish and Portuguese merchants to expand transpacific trade routes
beyond the standard Manila-Acapulco run was ultimately unsuccessful, as these initial voyages
failed to inaugurate regular, direct trade between China and the Americas. This flurry of
commercial activity in the late 1580s was not lost on the Consulado, though. For Sevillean
merchants, Philip II’s preliminary attempts to suppress transpacific trade had done little to ease
their anxiety over the availability of Asian imports in colonial markets. Trade with Chinese
merchants persisted despite the 1586 ban and a steady stream of reports detailing the expansion
o f the Manila Galleon trade network continued to arrive in Spain.
In order to defend their commercial monopoly over colonial markets, the Consulado
began to place increasing pressure on Philip II to follow up on his 1586 cedula. In 1589 the
Consulado wrote to the king, “when the fleets from Castille arrive [to the New World] they now
have less sale for their goods, since the market is supplied by cheaper merchandise from China,
and the Philippines. This results in great damage and prejudice to the royal revenues, and is a
grave blow to the commerce, since it is clear that the fleets to do not go so heavily laden as
formerly, nor do they bring back so much gold and silver on return.”115 There was undoubtedly
some exaggeration in the Consulado’s report but it is clear that Sevillean merchants were facing
stiff competition in colonial markets from Asian imports. One of the challenges for future
research is to determine the extent o f this competition.
Along with the Consulado, Portuguese officials in Lisbon were also beginning to voice
their concerns over transpacific trade. In 1590, Philip II received a letter explaining in detail how
the continuation of commerce between Asia and the New World constituted a threat to
Portugal’s commercial empire in the Far East. The Portuguese were quick to remind Philip II
that it was their forefathers’ blood and treasure that had won control of Asian trade for the royal
crown. Castilian merchants in Manila, however, were now threatening to seize control of this
115 Quoted in William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 405.
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commerce. According to officials in Lisbon, Portuguese garrisons, fleets, and trading posts in
Asia were maintained primarily through income derived from trade with China. If transpacific
trade was allowed to continue, “the income from the customs duties, on which Yndia is
supported, will necessarily be lost. N or will there be money or forces with which many large
fleets may be organized by his Majesty for its preservation and defense, or with which to pay the
soldiery stationed there.” 116
Having explained the danger that transpacific trade posed to their own interests, the
Portuguese went on to warn Philip II of the potential threat to Spain’s continued dominance of
the New World. “When Chinese merchandise is in the western Indies [the Americas] and money
is flowing to China, trade and commerce with Hispana will necessarily fall off, together with the
income of the custom house at Sevilla, while money will be scare there and throughout Espana.”
The decrease in trade between Spain and its colonies and with it the profit of the Consulado, was
not the only danger that the Portuguese sought to draw Phillip II’s attention to. “If navigation is
permitted from the western Indias to China, all the money and coin in the kingdom will flow
thither and none will go to Hespana. [As a result] the Indias will come to have no need of
Hespaha, because all the products obtained from this country can be obtained from China in
much great abundance and more cheaply.” 117 According to the Portuguese, Philip II risked
losing economic control of his American colonies unless transpacific trade was suppressed.
The warnings from the Consulado and the Portuguese cannot be considered objective.
Each was seeking to safeguard their own commercial interests by raising alarm over the
importation of Asian goods to the New World via the ‘nao de la China’ trade network. Their
reports to Philip II, however, echoed information emanating from Peru during the same period.
In a series of dispatches spanning the years 1590-1594, Viceroy Canete informed Philip II that

1.6 Blair and Robertson, 'Vol. V II, “Letter from Portugal to Felipe II,” 190.
1.7 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V II, “Letter from Portugal to Felipe II,” 190.
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lower priced Asian goods were readily available in Peruvian markets and they were underselling
Spanish imports. By 1592, taxes collected on imported Asian goods from New Spain at El Callao
were said to have equaled those regularly collected on Spanish merchandise.

118

Equally alarming

was the news that despite a recent interruption in the supply of goods from Seville, Peruvian
merchants withheld a sizable volume o f European imports. These goods were reportedly
becoming increasingly harder to sell due to the availability and lower price of Asian merchandise.
Echoing Enriquez a decade earlier, Canete also noted that the cheapness of Chinese silks
resulted in “Indian caciques and even com m oners.. .using them for clothing instead o f [locally
produced] cloth.”119 The widespread consumption o f Chinese silk in Peru provides supporting
evidence to the report of Governor Gomez Perez Dasmarinas of the Philippines that by 1592
190
the importation of textiles from Manila had come to exceed those from Spam. “ Unlike the
Portuguese or members of the Consulado, Viceroy Canete cannot be considered an enemy of
transpacific trade. Like other colonial officials, he lobbied the Crown on behalf of local
merchants, requesting that three to four vessels be allowed to sail directly between Lima and
Manila in 1590. Rather than wait for permission from Philip II, he dispatched a ship to the
Philippines later that year, sending with it a substantial amount of his own money. 121 Canete’s
reports do not completely validate the expressed concerns of the Consulado or the Portuguese
but they do indicate that their fears may have been based on actual developments in colonial
markets.
Faced with the continuing drain of silver to Asia, the flow of Chinese imports to the
Americas, and the increasing warnings from his subjects concerning these trends, Philip II was

118 W oodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 151, Footnote 146.
119 W oodrow Borah, Early Co IoniaI Trade, 120-121.
120 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V II, “Three Letters from Luis Perez Dasmarinas toFelipe II,” 267.
121 “Canete himself admitted to sending 8,000 ducats on the vessel forinvestment on his own account, the
amount being that o f a permit he had to import merchandise each year from Spain without tax.”
W oodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 118.
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forced to yet again attempt to gain control of transpacific commerce. In a 1593 decree the king
stated, “as the merchants and other persons in the N orthern Sea who trade in these our
kingdoms of Castilla, and in the Yndias, have suffered so many losses during past years, and
those engaged in the profits of the Chinese trade have gained so much, the latter has increased
greatly, while the commerce of these my said kingdoms has declined.”

122

To preserve the

Consulado’s trade monopoly and the Portuguese commercial position in Asia, Philip II reissued
past restrictions and extended existing regulations on transpacific trade. Once again, all trade in
oriental goods between New Spain, Peru, and Tierra Firme was strictly forbidden. To limit the
drain of silver and flow of Asian goods to New Spain, a series of new regulations on transpacific
shipping was introduced. Galleons leaving Mexico would henceforth be allowed to carry only
250,000 pesos’ worth of silver or goods while on the return trip from Manila the value o f all
cargo could not exceed 500,000 pesos. Furthermore, only two ships with a total carrying capacity
o f 300 toneladas would be allowed to ply the trade route each year.

123

In response to the regulations of 1593, Viceroy Villamanrrique did not, on this occasion,
write to the king that he “saw fit to disregard” them. Nonetheless, successfully enforcing the
decree and through it severely limiting commerce between Asia and the New World would prove
to be as difficult as ever. It was not just the lure of lower priced merchandise that was now
driving colonial merchants towards transpacific trade but the actions of the Philip II and events
in the Atlantic as well. In 1590, the Crown’s deteriorating financial position and mounting
military expenditures had driven Philip II to confiscate all private consignments of silver en route
to Spain. A royal declaration was published throughout Spanish America to reassure the
merchant community that this was a one-time occurrence driven by extraordinary events. Both

122 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VII, “Restrictions on Commerce,” 298-300.
123 Robert Reed, Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines: A. study of the Impact of Church and State (Manila: The
University o f Manila, 1967), 125-126.
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Charles V and Philip II had, however, regularly confiscated private silver remittances to Spain
and the practice would continue in the future.124
Instability in Europe was also a growing concern for both Peruvian and Mexican
merchants. Prolonged war with the English and Dutch impacted transatlantic shipping during
the 1590s, placing further strains on colonial merchants involved in trade with Seville. Repeated
attempts by Spain’s rivals to capture a Spanish treasure fleet returning from the Indies increased
the cost of transatlantic shipping while also highlighting Spain’s difficulties in protecting Atlantic
trade routes. Frequent assaults by the English on the Azores and, in 1596, the port of Cadiz also
interrupted the departure times of Spanish fleets bound for the New World and increased the
likelihood of encountering strong tropical storms or hurricanes. As a result of these
developments, colonial merchants conducting trade with Seville faced mounting commercial
uncertainty, difficulty in securing shipment of merchandise, and increasingly longer waits on
returns from their commercial investments.125 In a 1594 letter to Philip II, Viceroy Canete
touched upon each of these developments, offering a poignant summary of the commercial
climate in the Americas.

The merchants of the entire realm (and particularly those o f this city)
complain continually of the multitude of taxes they pay in Spain and Panama, of
the abuses and incontinences they suffer, and of the lack of security for their
property on the journey. As a result, they now make their purchases in New
Spain, for the voyage between the port where purchases are made [Acapulco]
and here avoids all the expense and risk of going to Spain. This year and last a
124 Mauricio Drelichman argues that “a plausible conjecture is that the Crown’s willingness to confiscate
private treasure to defray expenses might have constituted an implicit guarantee on its overall credit
worthiness” with European bankers. “All That Glitters; Precious Metals, Rent Seeking and the Decline o f
Spain,” European Review of Economic History, 9 (2005): 313-336.
125 W oodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 95, 121, 156 Footnote 26.
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dozen ships have sailed to Mexico, leaving this colony swept clean o f silver.
Although in my administration, your majesty has been sent larger remittances
on treasury account that in any other, remittances [to Spain] by private people
are much smaller than before. The silver that used to be sent in the Tierra Firme
fleets, goes now to New Spain

Chinese merchandise is so cheap and Spanish

goods so dear that I believe it impossible to choke off the trade to such an
extent that no Chinese ware will be consumed in this realm.126

More archival research is needed before a precise understanding of colonial merchant
activity can be gained for this period but a general trend can be gleaned from Canete’s reports
and other sources. There appears to have been a growing independent streak in colonial
merchant communities. Both Peruvian and Mexican merchants began to distance themselves
from the interests of their Sevillean counterparts and resisted efforts by the Crown to gain
control over their commercial activity. While Canete’s letter dealt with the plight of Peruvian
merchants, those of New Spain faced similar obstacles to trade with Seville. Many undoubtedly
responded in the same manner and began shifting their attention and resources to trade with
Asia. Their numbers were significant: some 246 individual Mexican merchants were involved in
commerce with Manila by the 1590s. 127 The majority of merchants in Mexico may have
continued to hold strong commercial and familial ties to Seville but by the late sixteenth-century
some had begun to distance themselves from the Consulado by establishing local guilds in New
]7 8
Spain. " In Mexico City, a local consulado was established in 1594 and, according to Robert

Smith, by the early 1600s it openly “advocated freedom of trade in the Pacific area, [although]
126 Quoted in W oodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 121-122.
127 Louisa Hoberman, Mexico's Merchant Elite, 39.
128 Etsuko Miyata Rodriguez, “The Early Manila Galleon Trade: Merchants’ Networks and Markets in
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Mexico.” In Donna Pierce, ed. Asia <&Spanish America: Trans-Pacific
Artistic and Cultural Exchange, 1500-1850 (Denver, CO: Denver Art Museum, 2000), 43.
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not on general principles, but for the benefit of merchants and shippers belonging to the
guild.” 129
In Peru, merchants refused in 1594 to follow their Mexican counterparts in organizing a
local consulado. While their reasons for doing so remain unclear, it is likely that they believed
forming a merchant guild would render them increasingly vulnerable to forced donations and
other financial concessions at the hands of the Crown.130 It is also possible that smaller
merchants specializing in inter-Pacific colonial trade feared that commercial elites with strong
ties to Seville would dominate a consulado in Lima. Both concerns were legitimate, and their
refusal to form a merchant guild was likely influenced by a desire to safeguard their access to
Asian wares at Acapulco.
To the consternation of Mexican, Peruvian, and some Portuguese merchants, free trade
in the 1590s was not of course, a reality. The latest push by Philip II to restrict trade with China
was therefore met with an increasing turn to contraband trading in both silver and Asian goods.
In 1597, the lawyer and colonial official Antonio de Morga informed the King that the heavily
loaded San Felipe had been forced to anchor at Japan while in route to Acapulco. Once in port,
“the emperor of that country, Taycosama [Go-Yozei], covetous of the treasure with which it was
laden, took it all.” According to Morga, the treasure was worth around 1.5 million pesos, three
times the legal limit.

131

In 1599, Governor Tello o f the Philippines wrote to Philip III concerning

a group of Peruvian merchants who had recendy arrived “loaded down with money to be
registered— although the fiscal of your royal Audiencia and another royal official, who went to
inspect the ships, could not find any proof, as the money had all been taken out before they

129 Robert Smith, “The Institution o f the Consulado in N ew Spain,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 24
(1944): 64, 67-68, 70.
130 John Melzer, Bastion of Commerce in the City of Kings: The Consulado de Comercio de Uma 1593-1887 (Lima,
Peru: Editorial Concytec Peru Press, 1991), 8-9.
131 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X, “Letter from Antonio de Morga to Felip II,” 25.
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arrived.” 132 While the exact amount of silver bullion these merchants had brought to Manila
remains unknown, their haste to unload it before officials could board their ship leaves little
doubt that it was beyond the legal limit. The Italian merchant Francesco Carletti also testified to
the ease and regularity o f transpacific smuggling in an account o f his and his father’s journey
from Acapulco to Manila in 1596. Having arranged for passage on a galleon as “pretend officers”
they secured an official license to travel to the Philippines. Before embarking they “confidently
placed [their money] in the hands of the ship’s captain, who was used to carrying such things for
various people.. .and a million gold scudus rode along that way despite the order [of Philip II]
and a sender was obliged to pay the captain two scudos out of ever hundred.”

133

The restrictions on the size and number of ships allowed to sail annually to the
Philippines was also routinely violated following the 1593 decree. In the same letter discussing
the Peruvian merchants, Tello informed the king that three ships had arrived from New Spain,
two of which were owned and operated by private individuals. He also noted that a five
hundred-ton ship had been recendy built in Manila and was currently en route to Acapulco.134 In
late 1599 and early 1600, a total of five ships from the Philippines made port at Acapulco, three
o f which may have been privately owned commercial vessels. One of these ships, the Santo
Tomas, was carrying two million pesos’ worth of silver when it wrecked two years later near
Luzon. In 1601, the 1000-ton Santa Margarita was blown off course before being lost near the
Mariana Islands on its return journey to Mexico. Spanish officials subsequently blamed its loss
on severe overloading.135
This evidence suggests there was litde enforcement of the 1593 restrictions on

132 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X , “Letter from Governor D on Francisco Tello,” 250-251.
133 Francesco Carletti, My Voyage Around the World, 70. One scudos or escudos was roughly equivalent to
two pesos, thus Carletti alleges that some two millions pesos left for Manila.
134 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X , “Letter from Governor D on Francisco Tello,” 249-250.
135 “The loss is attributed by some to disagreement amount the officers, and by others the late sailing o f
the ships, and to a lack o f sailors, and (what is more nearly correct) to the general overloading o f the
vessels.” Blair and Robertson, Vol. X II, “Principal Points in Regard to the Trade o f the Filipinas,” 46.

68
transpacific trade. Colonial officials expressed as much to Philip II directly, telling him that any
attempt to do so was hopeless. In New Spain, Viceroy Velasco pushed instead for a loose
enforcement o f the regulations. He was no doubt compelled to do so by the town council of
Mexico City, which continued to inform the king o f the extent to which Mexican commerce
depended on the re-export of Asian wares.136 The lax enforcement o f trade regulations allowed
the amount of silver leaving the New World to steadily increase through the last decade of the
sixteenth-century and the opening years of the seventeenth. By 1602, the Mexico City Cabildo
estimated that five million pesos left the Americas via the Manila-Acapulco run each year, with
three-fifths of this total originating in Peru.137 The figure of five million pesos, by far the largest
sum put forward by officials at the time, is significant in respect to the size of Spanish Adantic
silver flows during the early seventeenth-century. According to economic historian Richard
Garner, “around 1600 the Adantic remittances (reported as remittances to Castile) were running
at more than 50 million pesos per quinquennium or more than 10 million per year.”

138

Thus, the

Cabildo’s estimate of transpacific trade placed the total value of silver been shipped to Asia at a
little less than half of the amount flowing to Europe. In terms of trade, however, “the amount of
silver [from Peru and New Spain] leaving Acapulco for Manila was [already by 1597] greater than
the value of New Spain’s trade with Spain.” 139
Despite new regulations, threats to the Seville Consulado’s commercial monopoly,
Portuguese trade with Asia, and the finances of the Crown continued. With the death of Philip II
in 1598, the burden of empire fell on Philip III. In a 1603 report titled Trincipal Points in
Regard to the Trade of the Filipinas’ an unknown author informed the newly crowned monarch
that along with Chinese textiles, imported goods from Asia such as “earthenware, wax, nails, and

136 Louisa Hoberman, Mexico's Merchant Elite, 215.
137 O.H.K. Spate, The Spanish Take, 201.
138 Richard Garner, “Where Did All the Silver Go?,” 56.
139 Peter Bake well, A. History of Latin America to 1825, Third Edition, 253.
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other merchandise” were contributing to a decline in Adantic commerce. As a result, “the
commerce of Espana with Piru and Tierra Firme is ceasing, and merchandise from Espana is not
sent to P iru.. .if this be not checked within a few years, it is agreed by all that the trade o f Espana
in merchandise with Tierra Firme, Piru, and Nueva Espana will cease.” 140The Bishop of Rio de
la Plata likewise warned Philip III “in order that the Yndias may not be ruined, they should be
dependent upon and subordinate to Espana, and there should be a close relationship between
the different parts [of the Kingdom].” This dependence was threatened, however, by “the
diversion of the commerce between the Yndias and Espana to other kingdoms, not belonging to
his Majesty, but heathen and pagan; such as is now the case between Nueva Espana, Peru, and
the Filipinas.” As a result, the wealth of New World “passes into the possession of the Chinese,
and is not brought to Espana.” 141
Coming on the heels of these reports was equally sobering news concerning commercial
activity in Peru. In many respects, the two letters that the king received from the Viceroy Conde
de Monterrey in 1603 were identical to those of Viceroy Canete a decade earlier. According to
Monterrey, Spain’s trade with Peru was declining because o f the excessive duties and long delays
that had come to characterize Atlantic commerce. As a result, “the merchants of Lima, who were
formerly very rich and had ample credit, have [now] become debtors; and this is the reason why
the merchants of Seville do not make the same profits as formerly.” Commerce between Peru
and New Spain on the other hand, “has increased greatly” and now “Peruvian merchants prefer
to go the Nueva Espana to make their investments rather than to Espana.”
Monterrey went on to explain that the traffic between the two viceroyalties contained a
high volume of Chinese goods and that lesser quality textiles imported from Asia were worn “by
the very poor, and the negroes, and mulattoes (both male and female), sambahigos [sons of

140 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X II, “Principal Points in Regard to the Trade o f the Filipinas,” 46.
141 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X II, “Opinion o f Fray Martin Ignacio de Loyola,” 57.
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Indian men and African women], many Indians, and half-breeds, and this in great number.”
Churches throughout the colony were also richly adorned in Chinese silk where “before, because
o f the inability to buy silks of Espana, [they] were very bare.” Monterrey closed with the standard
plea to reopen direct trade between Peru and Manila. He argued that the traffic in Chinese wares
was extremely beneficial to the Peruvian economy and could be equally lucrative for the royal
treasury if the king were to sanction the commerce and collect duties on Asian im ports.142
Philip III scarcely considered allowing the expansion of transpacific trade beyond the
Manila-Acapulco route. Nor did he seriously consider the option of allowing trade to be
conducted beyond the limitations of 1593 despite the potential revenue from import duties. Like
his father, Philip III was financially dependent on the continued flow of New World silver for
servicing existing debt and contracting for new loans to risk a further and perhaps even larger
inflow of Asian goods to the Americas. At the same time, Philip III had to safeguard Portuguese
trade in Asia. For one, there was the meager income from the royal pepper monopoly and
import taxes levied on the Cape route to preserve. More importandy, the king had to safeguard
the ability of his Portuguese subjects to defend their commercial empire in Asia against growing
English and Dutch threats. Doing so would in turn help to maintain the support of Lisbon
merchants and the continued allegiance of Portugal to the Crown of Castile. Philip III, therefore,
had little choice but to continue his father’s efforts to limit transpacific trade.

R egulating the Pacific

“It should not be lost sight of that New Spain is a colony which ought to be dependent on the mother-country. It
requires great prudence to regulate this dependence and to see that the interest in its maintenance is mutual and

142 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X II, “Extracts from Two Letters from the Conde de Monterrey,” 57.
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reciprocal\ fo r it would cease the moment that the necessity was no longerfelt here fo r European manufactures and
otherproducts.

Juan Revillagigedo, viceroy of New Spain

In the three decades following the establishment of Spanish Manila, the complementary
demand for silver in China and merchandise in Spanish America had transformed the vast
Pacific into a vibrant commercial space. By 1604, millions of pesos’ worth of silver and goods
moved annually between Asia and the Americas with trade remaining largely confined to the
ports o f Manila and Acapulco and limited to ‘Urdaneta’s Route’. However, Penalosa in Manila,
Villamanrrique in New Spain, and even the Portuguese in Macao had each demonstrated that an
expanded commercial network in the Pacific was not only possible but also commercially
advantageous. It was this very expansion that the Crown had fought to prevent since Penalosa’s
call in the early 1580s to develop direct trade between Manila and ports in Central and South
America. Since then, transpacific commerce had increased to the point that it may have posed a
legitimate threat to the Consulado’s hold on colonial markets, the Portuguese commercial empire
in Asia, and the financial underpinning o f the Crown of Castile.
In practice, Philip II’s regulations of 1593 had been an attempt by Spain to commercially
isolate the New World from Asia. While these restrictions had largely failed, Philip III did not
abandon the effort to safeguard the financial resources of his empire through commercial
regulations. In 1604, the young king established a regulatory framework governing trade between
the New World and Asia that was to remain nearly unchanged for the next two centuries.
The “Decree Regulating Commerce with Nueva Espana” issued in 1604, contained few
restrictions on transpacific commerce that were not already in place. In this sense, Philip III was
compiling and reissuing the many trade regulations that had been enacted over the previous two
decades. The decree itself opened with a review of these laws, which according to the king had
so far failed to “obviate the loss...to these kingdoms and to their trade and commerce” owing to
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them being ignored by “the citizens o f Nueva Espana, Peru and other provinces... [with the full]
knowledge and permission of my viceroys, and governors.” Having admonished colonial officials
for their lax enforcement of regulations, the king followed by stating, “I should command the
entire prohibition of the trade of the said Nueva Espana with the said Philipinas Islands.”
Conceding that the termination o f transpacific commerce would result in the eventual loss of the
Philippines and an end to the spread o f Catholicism in Asia, Philip III pulled back from an
outright ban. Instead, he commanded that henceforth all regulations were to be strictly enforced,
and that transgressors would suffer the “penalties without any exemption or remission.”143
N ot content with simply enforcing existing trade laws or promising to prosecute those
who violated them, Philip III ordered colonial officials to implement several new restrictions.
From this point on, two, 200-ton ships were to annually ply the Pacific with the king stipulating
“they shall be my vessels, and shall sail on my account...for in this way they will... [not] exceed this
number and capacity.” With this order, Villamanrrique’s designs for a transpacific commercial
space frequented by privately owned vessels and dominated by colonial merchants was laid to
rest. Philip III specifically commanded that ships could no longer sail “on the account of private
persons...[which] must without fail cease.” The Pacific was to be not just a Spanish lake but one
controlled and traversed exclusively by royal vessels with private Spanish merchants and ships
forbidden to operate independently in its waters.
To crack down on smuggling and the ability of Mexican and Peruvian merchants to
travel to and from Manila, existing regulations pertaining to galleon officers and sailors were
expanded. All crewmembers were barred from taking part in trade and were forbidden to load
“any article whatsoever” on royal vessels engaged in transpacific crossings. The number of
crewmen allowed to serve on each voyage was also capped on account of there frequently being
many “artillerymen and sailors.. .who were not such” on past voyages. The governor of New
143 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X III, “Decree Regulating Commerce with Nueva Espaha,” 256.
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Spain was in turn ordered to allow only those individuals planning on becoming citizens of the
Philippines from traveling to Manila. Thus merchants like Carletti would no longer be able to
serve as ‘pretend officers’ and accompany their valuable cargo either to or from Manila. N or
would ship captains be able to stow silver and merchandise for themselves or merchants.
The 1604 decree not only placed control over transpacific voyages squarely in the hands
of the Crown, it set up an elaborate system for regulating the loading and unloading o f all vessels
sailing to and from Manila. A royal inspector and an accountant were commanded to accompany
each voyage so that they might “keep account and system in everything. And they shall inspect
the articles laded as merchandise, and carried back on return in the said ships, and account for
them in their books.” To assist them in this duty, all merchandise being loaded in Manila was to
be inspected and noted in the ship’s registry by members o f the royal exchequer. Once the
galleons reached Acapulco “everything shall be again checked off, and appraised...and the proper
measures shall be taken to ascertain and learn what has come registered, and whatever shall be
found to have come without registry, and whatever is carried contrary to the said prohibition,
shall be confiscated.” A similar system was devised for ships embarking from New Spain in
order to limit the amount of silver leaving the Americas to 250,000 pesos a year. In closing,
Philip I l l ’s decree issued one last warning to his colonial officials. “And in all cases of remissness
or carelessness which these my ministers shall display in the fulfillment and execution of said
orders, I command that the penalties be executed against them, and the example which the affair
demands shall be made.” 144
The reaction to Philip I l l ’s decree in the New World and the Philippines was, like those
o f his father, mixed. Transpacific smuggling of both silver and Asian goods remained rampant,
as did the trade in Chinese wares between New Spain and Peru. Thus, despite the threats from
Philip III, government officials on both ends of the trade network continued to collude with
144 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X III, “Decree Regulating Commerce with Nueva Espaha,” 256.
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local merchants to thwart restrictions. There would be the occasional official who sought to
enforce royal regulations to their full extent but they were few and far between and their impact
on the overall nature of the trade was limited.145 More often than not, the wealth that could be
had for simply turning a blind eye to royal regulations was too enticing for most to ignore. Trade
with the Philippines in general was too valuable and the profits to be gained to high for such
restrictions to be totally enforced or respected. In this way, the regulation of the Manila Galleon
trade network was no different from the host of orders issued from Madrid throughout Spain’s
history as an imperial power. The distance and time separating colonial viceroys from their
sovereign meant that royal orders, when actually received, could be outdated, out of touch with
the reality, or simply unenforceable for a variety o f reasons. The prevailing attitude in Spain’s
colonies was, wrote Schurz, seguarda la orden, pero no se cumple. “That is to say, royal orders were
scrupulously respected, but not complied with.”146
Due to the high degree of smuggling throughout the history of the Manila Galleon, most
historians have regarded Spanish efforts to control transpacific commerce as a failure. However,
the significance of Spanish efforts to restrict trade between the New World and Asia is not to be
found in the Crown’s constant battle against contraband goods. Rather, in spite of this illicit
commerce the Crown achieved remarkable success in limiting the further development of the
Manila Galleon trade network after 1604. While other variables including the fall of the Ming
dynasty and the seventeenth century depression in Spanish America impacted transpacific trade,
Philip I l l ’s regulatory policies worked effectively to contain this commerce. As a result, despite

145 The m ost prominent example o f an official enforcing the 1604 regulations to their full extent is Don
Pedro de Quiroga y Moya. In 1637, Quiroga y Moya ordered the entire cargo o f two Manila Galleons to be
inspected at Acapulco. Finding the cargo to be valued at four time the amount permitted he seized the
majority o f the imported merchandise, “short changing the Manila merchants o f as much as 1,500,000
pesos.” (178) For a full account o f this episode see William J. McCarthy, “Between Policy and Prerogative:
Malfeasance in the Inspection o f the Manila Galleons at Acapulco, 1637,” Colonial Vatin American Historical
Review 2, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 163-184.
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the fact that smuggling continued to run rampant throughout the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies, the Manila-Acapulco run remained the sole commercial route connecting Asia and the
Americas. Privately owned commercial vessels were also excluded from the commerce and
commercial voyages to and from Manila were held at around two per year. The success of these
measures resulted in the total volume and value o f annual trade being capped by the amount of
silver and merchandise that could be loaded on to two royal-owned and operated galleons. The
only way to expand commerce was to illegally build larger vessels that could make the annual
voyage. Despite the impressive size of some of Manila Galleons, over 1000 tons by the early
1600s and upwards of 1500 to 2000 tons by the eighteenth-century, the amount of cargo that
could be shipped was limited to what could be safely transported onboard two ships.
Even with commerce between China and the Americas being restricted in this way, the
Consulado’s control of colonial markets would come under increasing attack over the course of
the next two centuries. It would not be Asian imports that slowly diminished Seville’s trade with
the New World however. Rather, European imports delivered by rival Dutch, English, French,
and Portuguese merchants would be the main culprits. The same could be said for the
Portuguese trading empire in Asia. The severe regulation of transpacific trade after 1604 may
have prevented a further expansion of commerce between China and the New World but it did
not prevent a gradual displacement of the Portuguese in Asia at the hands of rival European
merchants. N or did it secure Portugal’s control of the Cape route.
The regulatory policy instituted by Philip III in 1604, however, was not a panacea for
securing the commercial and financial power of the Spanish-Portuguese empire. Like the series
of trade regulations enacted by Philip II, the 1604 policies were a reaction to developments
taking place half way around the world and were designed primarily to preserve exiting revenue
streams from the New World. Primary sources reviewed here also indicate that it may have
threatened the Portuguese commercial empire in Asia and Spanish-Atlantic trade with the New
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World. There is little doubt that members of the Consulado exaggerated the threat that Asian
imports could wrest control of colonial markets from them and cause a substantial decline in
Atlantic commerce. The Portuguese were also probably guilty of overstating the danger that
transpacific trade posed to their commercial position in Asia. The actual extent of transpacific
trade’s threat to the interests of both groups and the finances o f the Crown of Castile remains
unknown. It is clear that China, and Asia in general, could provide a substantial quantity of
textiles, ceramics, spices, metal goods, and various luxury items to New World markets. Could
the Manila Galleon network have also provided import substitutes for traditional European
goods and foodstuffs or supplies o f raw materials and slaves for use in the expanding mining and
agricultural sectors of Spanish America? Providing a definitive answer to this question is beyond
the scope of this thesis. Exploring what a more developed early modern Pacific commercial
network could have looked like in the absence of Spanish regulation, however, can begin the
process of answering this question.

An Early M odem Pacific World?

Counterfactual exercises are poor substitutes for archival research. However, exploring
the possibility of a more commercially developed early modern Pacific can help to begin the task
of gauging the extent of transpacific trade’s threat to the Consulado’s hold over Spanish
American markets. Doing so will also allow for the opportunity to examine economic, social, and
political factors that could have worked for and against an expansion of the Manila Galleon trade
network beyond levels in the early seventeenth-century. While large volumes of consumer goods
flowed through Manila on their way to Acapulco at this time, Spanish American markets
demanded more than simply textiles, ceramics, or spices. The economies of Spanish America
were dependent on imported supplies o f slaves, raw iron, metal tools, and, in the case of New
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Spain, mercury. The question is, could transpacific trade have delivered adequate and consistent
supplies of such goods and did colonial merchants possess the means and impetus to expand
trade with Asia in these and other commodities?
It is clear that the expansion of silver mining in the Americas beginning in the mid1500s stimulated the growth and development of the wider colonial economy. The exchange of
American silver for Asian wares in turn stimulated the development of transpacific trade after
1571. The New World mining industry was, however, largely dependent on foreign imports of
iron and steel and, by the early 1600s, mercury. The extraction of silver and gold ore required a
steady supply of shovels, picks, crowbars and other tools. Iron was also needed for the
construction of stamp mills to crush extracted silver ore in preparation for the amalgamation
process. Most of the iron and steel used in New World mining industries during this period
originated in the Basque country of Spain. Iron bars and steel tools, along with horseshoes, nails,
hinges, and other items accompanied supplies of textiles, spices, and other luxury items that
colonial merchants routinely shipped to backcountry mining centers.147
Despite the Basque provinces of Bizkaya and Gipuzkoa being well known for their iron
deposits and foundries, Spanish iron production paled in comparison to that of China. In the
eleventh-century, Chinese iron production is estimated at 125,000 tons, an output equal to that
o f Western Europe circa 1700.

143

Production is believed to have declined following the Mongol

invasion and collapse of the Song dynasty in the thirteenth-century but the extent o f this decline
and its duration remains debatable. As a result, there exists litde scholarly consensus or hard
figures on Chinese iron production during the Yuan (1271-1368), Ming (1366-1644), or even
Qing eras (1655-1912). Most historians believe that following the Mongol invasion, iron
production did not fully recover until the Ming era. Total output may have reached 160,000 tons
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annually during this period, although some historians contend that Ming production was only
around 45,000 tons, well bellow Song levels.149 Despite a lack of hard figures on production
under the Qing, Donald Wagner argues that in the early 1700s the Chinese iron industry was still
the largest and most efficient in the world.150 At this time, production may have reached 200,000
tons a year.151 In comparison, Western European iron production totaled 40,000 tons in 1500,
124.000 tons in 1600, and 165,000 tons in 1700.152
While historians disagree over the total volume o f production after the fall of the Song
Dynasty, it is known that the Chinese iron industry had shifted southward by the Ming era. By
the 1500s, the southern coastal provinces of Hunan, Guangdong, and Fujian were all major
centers of production. The city of Foshan in Guangdong province for example, turned out
30.000 tons of worth of iron cookware, weapons, tools, and wire each year. These goods not
only supplied local demand but were also exported throughout Southeast Asia.

153

The opening of direct trade with China therefore presented merchants in the New
World who supplied mining centers with a second source of iron. The actual price of imported
Asian iron in colonial markets is unknown but contemporaries noted its cheapness when
compared to European supplies. Some of the first Chinese merchants to make contact with
Spanish Manila in 1573 brought with them iron to trade and iron tools and bars are referred to
frequently in primary documents as being available for purchase in the Philippines. Such goods
also surface frequently in Manila Galleon shipments reaching Acapulco. The unknown author of
Trincipale Points in Regard to the Trade of the Filipinas’ even singled out iron nails when
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discussing the underselling of Spanish imports in the Americas. While there is no evidence
pointing to a lack of iron in colonial mining centers during this period, it seems certain that if
supplies of lower-priced iron were available they would have been bought by colonial merchants
who regularly supplied mining centers.
Like most Asian commodities reaching Acapulco, the quantity o f Chinese iron available
in colonial markets is unknown. Supplies of the metal could and probably did on occasion serve
as ballast for transpacific vessels but there is no evidence showing that Chinese iron was
imported by the ton during the late 1500s or early 1600s. While the possibility of this occurring
cannot by ruled out, the existence of a substantial transpacific trade in iron will remain sheer
speculation until further research is conducted. To answer this and other questions raised here
pertaining to Asian imports in Spanish America, future scholarship will need to examine
sixteenth and seventeenth-century colonial merchant inventories and, in the case of Chinese iron,
mining records.
Continued supplies of iron were crucial for the New World mining industry. Mercury
however, was an even more vital input, a dearth of which could literally grind all production to a
halt. Viceroy Martin Enriquez, who placed the distribution o f mercury in New Spain under the
control of the Crown in 1572, believed that “the sustenance of this land depends on the mines of
silver, and they cannot be maintained without mercury.” Some four decades later Viceroy Luis
de Velasco wrote that the “most important business that exists today in the Indies is the matter
o f quicksilver, for it is their principal support.”154 After iron tools and stamp mills had been used
to excavate and grind down silver ore, mercury was required to separate the precious metal so
that it could be melted into pure bars and ingots. A lack of mercury thus left the mine owners
unable to bring to market much of the silver that had been successfully excavated.

154 Quoted in Peter Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1971), 150.
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As evidenced by Viceroys Enriquez and Velasco, officials in both the New World and
Spain were well aware of the dependency of silver production on steady supplies of mercury.
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth-centuries, there were three main sources of
mercury available for use in the Americas. In central Peru lay the rich site of Huancavelica, in
southern Spain the Fugger controlled site of Almaden, and finally Idria, located in modern day
Slovenia. Up until the late 1500s, Huancavelica was able to supply all of Peru while production at
Almaden was channeled almost exclusively to New Spain. The 1590s however, saw Huancavelica
production peak and enter a slow secular decline.
The decline of Huancavelica mercury production was, according to Peter Bakewell, “in
part the result of conscious efforts to reduce production.. .but it also derived from intrinsic
difficulties in the mine which now began to appear and which were to become constantly
greater.” 155 The decrease in Huancavelica production forced officials in Spain to contract for the
mining of mercury at Idria and to divert European supplies of quicksilver to Peru at the expense
of New Spain. This in turn caused a shortage of mercury in Mexico, prompting Viceroy
Cadereita to complain in 1636 that while miners in New Spain required an estimated 6,000
quintals, the colony had received a paltry 634. Due to the lack of mercury, commerce in the
colony is said to have been hit with “a great frost” and silver remittances originating from
Zacatecas and the surrounding area having decreased by as much as two-fifths .'56
The potential o f a shortfall in mercury supplies, although routinely exaggerated by
colonial officials, was thus real and the consequences o f an actual dearth both immediate and farreaching in terms of silver remittances to Spain and the overall health of colonial economies. For
these reasons, government officials in the Philippines and the Americas continuously gauged the
possibility of acquiring further supplies of mercury from sources outside of Huancavelica,
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Almaden, and Idria. As early as 1592, Governor Desmarinas of the Philippines informed the
King that mercury could be bought from Chinese merchants for a “satisfactory price [and in]
whatever quantity is desired .” 157 Nothing seems to have come of this, for in 1601, following the
decline in production at Huancavelica, Viceroy Valesco in Peru again raised the possibility of
importing mercury from China, believing that considerable supplies could be had at
comparatively lower prices. In 1605, a Mexican official wrote to the king after hearing that the
rather unrealistic sum of 100,000 quintales of mercury was available for purchase in Canton. He
went on to inform Philip III that 1,000 to 1,500 quintales (100 to 150 tons) could be shipped
from Manila to Mexico at a “cost of 45 pesos 5 reales each, half the price of Spanish mercury
sold in New Spain.”

158

The reports o f readily available mercury in China prompted Spanish officials in the
Philippines to request in 1610 that the Portuguese supply Chinese mercury to the colony. A deal
was eventually reached and the Portuguese promised to sell the Spanish as much mercury as they
desired at around 50 pesos a quintal. One Pedro de Angula Salazar subsequently traveled to
Macao with some 25,000 pesos in hand and later received another 25,000 from Manila. An
additional 75,000 pesos was later dispatched from New Spain but the actual quantity of mercury
acquired by Salazar is unknown. At the time, Viceroy Marques de Salinas pleaded to the king for
the legal value of transpacific trade to be increased from 250,000 to 500,000 pesos a year in order
to allow for the importation of mercury from China . 159 This implies that significant quantities of
mercury may have been acquired by Spanish merchants in Manila, leading officials in New Spain
to try and gain royal permission for the importation of quicksilver from Asia.
Despite these efforts, little mercury seems to have arrived through legal channels to the
New World via Manila. Contraband trading could and probably did bring in small batches but
157 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VII, “A Letter from Luis Perez Dasmarinas to Felipe II,” 228.
158 Peter Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico, 152.
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these would not have amounted to much. More research on the availability of mercury for
export in China is required to assess whether or not transpacific trade could have offered a
substantial and consistent supply of mercury to the New World mining industry. It is clear from
the documentary record, though, that the prospect o f importing Chinese quicksilver was met
with strong opposition from Spain. Like all aspects o f transpacific trade, purchasing mercury
directly from China sparked fears over the continuing drain of American silver. The prospect of
contracting with Portuguese traders was also met with concern. Spanish officials feared that
Portuguese merchants would use the opportunity to import Asian wares into New World
markets. The lack of a more developed trade in mercury between China and Spanish America
has thus been explained by George Souza and Peter Bakewell as a consequence of the Crown’s
unwillingness to lend support to the endeavor .160
An unrestricted Pacific commerce might have supplied New World mining centers with
both iron and mercury from China. The obstacles to supplying Peru with relatively low weight
wares such as textiles from Spain was great enough; one can hardly imagine the difficulty of
crossing the Isthmus of Panama with a train of mules or laborers weighted down with steel tools,
iron bars, and flasks of mercury. The shortage o f mercury in New Spain during the 1630s could
have also been avoided through Chinese imports. To what extent this would have had on the
overall health of the industry and the wider economy can never be known. These developments
would have been largely dependent on an expansion in private commercial shipping along the
lines that both Penalosa and Villamanrrique sought in the 1580s and 90s. If these efforts had met
with success, the mining and refining industries of both China and the New World could have
formed a closer, perhaps symbiotic, connection.
A transpacific trade of this kind, tying together mining industries in Asia and the
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Americas, would have relied on Spanish American merchants, perhaps aided by the Portuguese.
O n the one hand, merchants would have required the material and financial resources to
construct ships capable of making regular voyages to and from Manila. Even before the
colonization of the Philippines, several small but capable shipbuilding industries existed along
the Pacific coastline o f Spanish America, particularly at Guatulco and Guayaquil. By the late
1500s, galleons were also being constructed at the Cavite yards near Manila. It was already
possible to expand the number of vessels plying the Pacific. The majority of ships trading
between New Spain, Panama, and Peru were privately owned, besides, either by merchants or
ship captains, and there are numerous instances of privately owned vessels making the annual
voyage to Manila as well. This indicates that some merchants did have access to the financial
capital to purchase or construct ships for use in transpacific trade. It seems plausible that if the
Crown and colonial officials had not restricted this trade, more would have done so.
O n the other hand, transpacific crossings were fraught with danger. N ot only was the
return journey especially long and difficult due to Pacific wind patterns but attacks by European
rivals, along with Chinese and Japanese pirates were always a potential threat. It is doubtful that
merchants would have invested heavily in transpacific trade without the development of an
elaborate convoy system similar to that which existed in the Atlantic. This would have decreased
the risk of private ships and their cargo from being seized or lost at sea. In all likelihood, this
would have required the establishment of colonial settlements along the California coastline with
facilities capable of receiving and supplying ships returning from the Manila. The idea of
establishing such a way station was actually floated in the late 1590s and the exploration of
suitable bays took place shortly afterwards. 161 Thus an expansion o f transpacific trade could have
prompted a tremendous acceleration in the spread o f Spanish control and settlement of the

161 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X IV , “Decree Establishing a Way-Station for Philipine Vessels on the
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Pacific coastline of N orth America. This would have undoubtedly taxed the resources of the
Crown and the colony of New Spain. Nonetheless, the outline of a hypothetical Pacific World
can clearly be seen emerging.
The development of a Pacific convoy system would have required more than simply an
increase in the shipment of Asian supplies destined for New World mining centers. A further
expansion o f transpacific trade beyond the levels o f the 1590s would have been contingent
largely on the continued demand for Chinese consumer goods. The seemingly inexhaustible
desire of wealthy colonial subjects for luxury items and instances of Indian, Spanish, and free
African laborers wearing Asian textiles is well known. Colonial markets were however, not
immune from becoming glutted with imported wares. While contemporaries in favor of trade
with Manila routinely discussed impressive sums o f revenue that could be had if only restrictions
were relaxed, these were a best crude guesses and were undoubtedly widely inflated. As Garner
has pointed out, “one is almost led to believe [from primary sources] that because of the mineral
resources the market was virtually inexhaustible regardless of price or quality.” 162 In reality,
though, markets were limited at the most basic level by the relatively low number of Spanish or
mixed blood consumers and the ever-decreasing population of indigenous subjects during this
period. The actual purchasing power of these groups also differed widely and just because some
laborers were observed wearing imported silks does not make them regular consumers.
Despite what some contemporary observers believed about the potential of transpacific
trade, there was a point at which colonial markets would have become saturated and any further
imported goods gone unsold. What precisely this point was remains unknown, but it would have
represented the limits to which transpacific trade could have expanded. It is worth noting that
the value of Atlantic trade may have risen throughout the 1600s despite a decrease in overall
tonnage and “a growing fraction of it consisted] of high value, low volume” goods that could
162 Richard Garner, “Where Did All the Silver Go?,” 80.
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not be produced in the Americas . 163 Thus, while the colonial market for Chinese goods was
never unlimited, it could have expanded modestly during the seventeenth-century.
Research on the importance of Asian imports and the workings of the colonial market in
general is limited for the period in question. As a result, knowledge concerning the actual
demand for and distribution of Asian or European imports for that matter is severely lacking.
Jane Mangan’s much appreciated work on the economy and society of colonial Potosi however,
has revealed the intricacies of the urban marketplace in colonial Latin America. Within these
commercial spaces, Spanish, Creole, indigenous, and African men and women played the role of
both consumers and suppliers of local and imported goods .164 Further research along these lines
and for locales other than prominent mining centers would thus go along way in assessing the
consumption patterns and purchasing power of colonial consumers.
The viability of an early modern Pacific World also rests on the extent to which colonial
merchants sought ever-expanding sums of commercial profit as opposed to operating under a
more commercially conservative strategy o f rent seeking. This leads to the familiar debate over
the degree to which the entrepreneur spirit existed in the colonial and wider Spanish social milieu
of the period. In regards to the latter, even a cursory reading of primary and secondary sources
reveals a wide range of individuals from various socioeconomic status who showed the
wherewithal and commercial acumen to pursue and develop a wide range of commercial
ventures. Thus, as Bakewell has argued in his study of seventeenth-century Potosi “millionaire”
Antonio Lopez de Quiroga, the “impressions o f backwardness, conservatism, and enervation in
Hispanic business belong more to Spain itself than to the colonies [and in] America,
entrepreneurship was by no means rare.. .and had in reality been a marked feature of colonial life
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from the conquests onwards.” 165
Even if colonial merchants engaged in transpacific trade are to be classified as
entrepreneurs, this does not preclude them from having used their commercial success in pursuit
o f rents. In short, having profited from the importation or distribution of Asian wares,
individuals could and probably did devote considerable financial sums to gaining control over
land, mines, and other natural or agricultural resources. Many would have also decided to forgo
further commercial interests and instead pursue political and social standing through titles of
nobility or positions in local government. The degree to which merchants actively pursued rent
seeking and social standing would thus have gone a long way in determining the extent to which
transpacific trade would have increased in the absence of government suppression.
As Braudel observed of early modern European merchants, such individuals did not
operate solely under “a mentality made up of calculation, reason, cold logic, a lack of normal
feelings, all subordinated to an unbridled appetite for gain.” 166 The same could be said for
colonial merchants in the New World. As both Spanish subjects and Christians, they possessed
considerable social, political, and cultural ties to their sovereign, motherland, and faith. Such ties
impacted the decision-making process when it came to commerce with Asia. Evidence of the
first two can be found in the numerous instances of merchants appealing to Philip II and III
directly or through colonial officials for the legal expansion of transpacific trade. Merchants in
Peru even proposed to Philip II that they pay a larger import tax on Asian goods in exchange for
the right to trade with the Philippines. Despite the high degree of contraband trading in the
Pacific, merchants were not as cavalier as one might think when disobeying the wishes of their
king. They often worked, rather unsuccessfully, through legal channels to expand commerce with
Asia. There was also undoubtedly tension surrounding continued trade with ‘infidels7 like the
165 Peter Bakewell, Silver and 'Entrepreneurship in Seventeenth-Century Potosi (Albuquerque, NM: University of
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Chinese or New Christian Portuguese and the risk that such commerce posed to the continued
power of the Catholic King and Christendom itself. To date, however, with the exception of
Borah’s Early Colonial Trade and Navigation Between Mexico and Peru and Louisa Hoberman’s
Mexico’s Merchant Elite, few in depth studies of colonial merchants for the period in question
exists. Even less is known about those operating primarily in inter-colonial Pacific or transpacific
trade.
As the development of Atlantic World historiography has shown, the creation of
commercial networks linking continents and societies entails more than simply the exchange of
resources and goods but the movement of people, ideas, and tastes as well. As of the present,
few scholars with the exception of Edward Slack in the recent article “The Chinos in New
Spain” have focused on the movement of people from Asia to the Americas along the Manila
Galleon trade route. As Slack has demonstrated, there were a substantial number of Chinese,
Japanese, Filipino, and Indian immigrants to New Spain during the early years o f transpacific
trade. Some were brought by Spanish and Portuguese merchants as personal servants, others as
slaves who may have numbered around 600 a year throughout the first decade of the
seventeenth-century .167 Filipinos and Chinese also served aboard Spanish ships and in fact
constituted the majority of transpacific sailors, sixty to eighty percent, by the early 1600s.
After arriving in Acapulco, few Chinos seem to have chosen to return to Asia, preferring
instead to settle in New Spain. Once in the Americas, many married indigenous, free and
enslaved African women and “ farmed rice (brought from the Philippines), corn, and cotton;
tended cacao and coconut palm tress; fished in the seas and rivers; and transported people and
goods to various ports along the coastline .” 168 Chino immigrants involved in palm tree
cultivation even created a palm wine industry in New Spain. By 1619, the beverage had
167 J.I. Israel, Race, Class, and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 75-76.
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reportedly become very popular with natives and posed a threat to the sale of imported wine
from Spain.

169

O ther Asian immigrants settled in urban centers throughout Mexico and took up

artisan trades, becoming blacksmiths, cobblers, tailors, and even vendors and barbers. The large
number of Chinese barbers in Mexico City led to an official complaint being lodged in 1635 with
the local cabildo. The cabildo recommended to the Viceroy that Chinese barbers be expelled
from the city center and their number limited to twelve. 170 What little is known concerning chino
immigration leaves open the possibility that unrestricted transpacific trade could have led to a
larger inflow of Asian immigrants or slaves and with them a cultural exchange akin to that which
took place in the Atlantic.
Specific factors such as the material demands of the New World mining industry, the
size of colonial markets, the disposition of colonial merchants towards rent seeking, and the
inflow of chino immigrants could have worked both for and against a further expansion of
transpacific trade. O ther economic and political forces, though, would have had an equal if not
greater impact. While Borah’s rather dismal view of Spanish American seventeenth-century
economic decline has since been revised, a decrease in the New World’s transoceanic commerce
did take place. In regards to trade with China, Richard von Glahn estimates that 326 tons of
silver flowed to the country from Manila during the first decade of the seventeenth century.
From this high point, the amount steadily fell, hitting a low of

8 .6

tons in the 1660s before rising

steadily to a little over 100 tons in the 1690s.171
While American silver production did decrease between 1630 and 1700 due to a decline
in production at Potosi, the cause for such a precipitous falling off of trade with China is not to
be found solely in the workings o f the colonial economy. Rather, it was China that was in fact
169 Blair and Robertson, Vol. 18, “Relation by Captain Sebastian de Pineda, on matters relating to the
Filipinas Islands,” 175-176.
170 Homer Dubs and Robert Smith, “Chinese in Mexico City in 1635,” The F'ar East Quarterly 1, no. 4
(1942): 387.
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undergoing severe economic decline and political instability during this period. Following the
sack of Beijing and the death of the last Ming Emperor in 1644, several provinces, including
Fujian and Guangdong, resisted subordination to the newly established Qing dynasty for two
decades. This, in conjunction with the onset of an economic depression in 1661, may have
*
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contributed to a severe decline in China’s trade with Manila.
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It is worth noting however, that

Richard von Glahn argues the “decline in official trade between China and the Philippines after
1620 most likely was offset by a proliferation of illicit trade on a scale comparable to the peak
years o f the official trade.”
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Therefore, transpacific commerce may have weathered the political

and economic instability of the seventeenth century as well if not better than Spanish Atlantic
trade.
Precipitating and in fact contributing to the possible decrease in transpacific trade and
the fall o f the Ming dynasty however, was the global convergence of bimetallic ratios —the
exchange rates between silver and gold. By the early 1640s, the value of silver in China had
decreased substantially and was roughly equivalent to the going rate in Europe . 174 Thus, even in
the absence of heavy regulations limiting transpacific trade, commerce between China and the
New World would have been severely strained by the decline in the value o f silver in Asia, the
decrease in American silver production, and the political and economic instability that engulfed
China during the mid seventeenth-century. By the opening of the 1700s, however, these trends
had slowed and were soon moving in reverse. Following the return of political stability,
population levels in China began to rise, driving economic expansion and an increase in demand
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for silver around the turn o f the eighteenth-century. As a result, the price of silver in Canton
exceeded that o f Europe by some fifty percent in the early 1700s. 175
While the value of silver in China remained high during the eighteenth-century, silver
production in the Americas, specifically the colony of New Spain, increased. Owning to the
immense reserves of Potosi, Peru had dominated New World silver production throughout the
1500s and well into the seventeenth-century. By the late 1600s, however, New Spain accounted
for roughly half o f all silver output in Spanish American, approximately 3.9 million out of 8.3
million pesos annually. Except for a brief fall in production levels in the 1760s, Mexican output
continued to surge, rising from 10.2 million a year in the 1720s to 23.1 million in the 1790s.
South American production expanded throughout the eighteenth-century as well but grew by
only 250 percent compared to an increase of 600 percent in New Spain . 176
Compared to levels around the turn of the seventeenth-century, silver production was
not the only economic indicator of New Spain to have shown a substantial increase. The
combined European, indigenous, and mixed blood population of New Spain stood at an
estimated 2.5 million in 1600. By 1700, it had risen to 4.5 million and would reach 6.5 million by
the opening of the nineteenth-century .177 Therefore, as Mexican silver production expanded so
to did its population. While a rise in population does not correspond directly to an increase
consumer demand, there is little doubt that the market for Asian commodities in New Spain was
greater in the 1700s. than the late sixteenth century. Throughout the eighteenth-century in fact,
Mexican officials placed the value of silver shipped annually to China at three to four million
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pesos (75-100 tons) . 178 These figures, like those o f sixteenth-century officials, are questionable
and the real value of trade was probably lower. However, even if these figures were inflated, the
possibility remains that transpacific trade levels had increased modesdy over Garner’s low
estimate of 700,000 and Flynn and Giraldez’s high of two millions pesos per year in the 1590s.
Therefore, despite seventeenth century political instability and a fall in the value of silver
in China, conditions on both ends of transpacific trade routes were advantageous for commerce
after 1700. China resumed its status a silver sink for much of the eighteenth-century while New
Spain’s silver production surged and population levels steadily increased after 1700. Furthermore,
despite the fact that Philip I l l ’s regulatory policy of 1604 remained in place and transpacific trade
was limited to two vessels a year, the eighteenth-century economies of China and New Spain
showed a remarkable degree of interconnectedness. William Schell has even argued that there
existed a silver symbiosis between China and Mexico throughout the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies. This “Sino-Mexican symbiosis entered its fullness as China’s population and domestic
economy recovered and Mexico replaced Peru as the world’s major silver producer” in the
1700s. 179 One is left to wonder to what extent this relationship could have developed under a
less restrictive regulatory system throughout the early modern period.
Ultimately, the question of whether or not transpacific trade would have increased in the
absence of government suppression is unanswerable. The outline of what an early modern
Pacific world could have looked like, though, points to the possibility that further expansion was
possible. Despite the feasibility o f a more developed economic relationship between Asia and the
New World, the argument put forward by various colonial officials that this would have caused a
collapse of Adantic trade must still be regarded as a gross exaggeration. Sixteenth-century
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transpacific commerce was a threat to the sale of some European imports in colonial markets. It
was not an existential threat to Atlantic commerce. In terms of specific goods such as textiles
and ceramics, cheaper and by some accounts finer quality Chinese imports could have spoiled
the market for their European counterparts. The same could have also occurred for jewelry,
devotional pieces, furniture, mercury, iron and other wares.
However, there were things China, and Asia in general could not have supplied to New
World markets in quantities large enough to meet total demand. Chief among these were slaves.
While there was a limited traffic in chino slaves during this period the totals never came close to
matching the number of African slaves delivered to the Americas by Portuguese merchants. Like
mercury, foreign supplies of bondsmen were vital to the colonial economies of the New World
by the late 1500s. As the indigenous population levels continued to decline throughout the first
half of the seventeenth century, this dependence on imported labor only increased. While it is
possible that an increase in chino slave trading could have helped meet the growing demand in
colonial markets for laborers, it is highly unlikely that transpacific commerce could have eclipsed
the Atlantic slave trade. By the late 1590s, over 2800 African slaves a year were arriving in
Spanish America annually, surpassing 3800 a year after the mid seventeenth century.

| gQ

The significant cultural ties between Europe and the New World would likely have also
mitigated a drastic falling off o f Atlantic commerce. Colonial elites were primarily oriented
towards European society and would have continued, for example, to ape the latest fashion
trends of the metropole. Thus, even if Chinese silk and perhaps Indian cotton had come to
dominate colonial markets, there would have remained a demand for Dutch linens, Rouen cloth,
and various decorative trimmings produced in European textile centers. Along with these goods,
Asian merchants would have also been unable to provide import substitutes for traditional
European foodstuffs such as “wine, brandy, flour, olive oil, preserved fruits, [and] nuts.” Despite
180 Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave, 25.
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the fact that colonial palates became increasingly creolized over time, Atlantic traffic in the above
items continued to be lucrative throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries. 181
Finally, an expansion of transpacific trade would have been constrained by the fact that
besides silver bullion, colonial Spanish American laborers produced little that Asian merchants
desired. Although mining remained the dominant economic activity within Spanish America,
there were other export-oriented industries that saw significant development during the colonial
period. Sugar for example, was one of the first colonial products to be exported to Europe and it
remained an extremely profitable transatlantic commodity throughout the early modern period.
Dyes were another colonial product that found a ready market in Europe. The export of both
indigo and cochineal from New Spain each surpassed half a million pesos a year by the opening
of the seventeenth-century. 182 Finally, other products such as tobacco, hides, and cacao would
have also continued to attract European merchants to Spanish American ports along the Adantic
seaboard for the duration o f the early modem period.
In short, the demand for African slaves, colonial exports other than silver, and cultural
ties to Europe would have prevented a drastic decrease in Atlantic commerce from occurring.
Instead, a more likely outcome of a less regulated Manila Galleon trade network would have
been a greater degree of specialization in the foreign trade of the New World. Colonial
production would have followed global trade routes to the markets where it was valued the most.
Increasing supplies of silver would have flowed across the Pacific to the Chinese sink in
exchange for ceramics, spices, silk thread, finished textiles, possibly mercury and iron, and other
various consumer goods. The total amount o f New World silver being shipped directly to Asia
would, however, have been contingent on the demand for Asian goods in colonial markets.

181 Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin America to 1825, Third Edition, 363.
182 Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin America to 1825, Third Edition, 235-237.
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Sugar, dyes, tobacco and other colonial commodities, along with still significant supplies of
silver, would, on the other hand, have continued to gravitate towards Europe.
Therefore, even in the absence of the Crown’s severe regulation of transpacific trade,
Mexico was unlikely to become the “center o f the world.” N or would the New World “come to
have no need o f Hespana” or the European wares and African slaves that Sevillean and
Portuguese merchants dealt in. However, the expansion of transpacific trade beyond the levels
obtainedJ in the late 1500s could have broken the Consulado’s hold on colonial markets. As
argued here, this would have dealt a severe blow to the already tentative finances of the Crown
of Castile and with them, the seventeenth century global empire o f Spain. The further
development o f the Manila Galleon trade network after the 1590s could have also led to a greater
degree of economic interdependence between Asia and the America, specifically China and New
Spain after 1700.

C onclusion

By adopting a global market framework and drawing from various historical subfields,
this paper has sought to frame the opening of transpacific trade as a global event. The flow of
American silver and Asian wares across the Pacific in the late 1500s altered global trade routes
and patterns of consumption and production in Asia and the New World. Rather than provide a
commercial windfall to Spain, access to the fabled riches o f Cathay quickly proved to be
nightmare for the commercial interests of the Sevillean Consulado and for the royal treasury. To
a lesser extent, it may have also posed a threat to the Asian commercial empire of the
Portuguese, after 1580 subject to Spanish crown authority. The Manila Galleon trade network
was one of many threats to Castilian hegemony in the late sixteenth and early seventeenthcenturies. But unlike political challenges such as the revolt o f the Spanish Netherlands, Turkish
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advances in the Mediterranean or the problem o f England, the opening o f transpacific commerce
had truly global implications.
Viewed in this light, current scholarship on the Manila Galleon trade network in the late
sixteenth-century prompts as many questions as it provides answers. It is clear that transpacific
commerce had a significant impact on global trade flows and with them, Spanish imperial
policymaking. What remains unclear is the extent o f the trade’s affect on these and other
historical developments throughout Spanish America, Eurasia, Africa, and the global trading
world in general. While major shortcomings of Manila Galleon historiography have been
touched upon already, they will be revisited here in order to map out a more comprehensive and
interdisciplinary research plan.
First, the historiography o f the Manila Galleon must be reevaluated in light of recent
developments in economic history and world-systems analysis. The debate over a European
versus Asian-centered early modern world economy remains unresolved. It is clear, however,
that the last two decades have witnessed significant changes in the ways historians conceptualize
global trade patterns and economic development during this period. Dennis Flynn and Arturo
Giraldez’s research on silver flows and that of Richard von Glahn on the Ming dynasty’s
monetary policy, has demonstrated the central place of China within the early modern silver
trade. Andre Gunder Frank’s sinocentric model of the early modern global economy and
Kenneth Pomeranz’s great divergence thesis have also complicated historical understandings of
the rise of the west and called into question Eurocentric interpretations o f world history. In
response to these historiographical and methodological developments, the work of Borah,
Schurz, Spate and others on transpacific trade must be reexamined. Rather than approach this
historiography from an Asian or sinocentric standpoint, though, scholars should adopt a global
market framework that focuses on the complementary demand for commodities that existed
between sixteenth-century markets in Asia and Spanish America.
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Despite the need to reassess the historiography o f the Manila Galleon, this body of
research provides a strong foundation on which to build a more comprehensive understanding
of the Manila Galleon commercial network. To move forward, however, requires careful
consideration of how present knowledge of early modern global economic structures both
complicate and challenge the work o f twentieth century scholars. To what extent for example,
did the assumption of European economic superiority vis-a-vis Asia lead earlier historians to
downplay the impact of transpacific trade on historical developments in Spanish America or the
threat that this commerce posed to the Consulado’s dominance of colonial markets? In contrast
to earlier scholars, by interpreting widely available and heavily cited primary sources within a
global market framework, this study has shown that these fears may have been genuine. To use
but one of many examples from the historiography o f the Manila Galleon, O.H.K. Spate’s
characterisation of the warnings over transpacific trade as “vastly exaggerated” claims from
“enemies of the [Manila] Galleon and the New Spain-Peru trade” can no longer be uncritically
accepted .183
Embracing recent developments in global economic history and world-systems analysis
is also the first step towards globalizing the history of the Manila Galleon beyond silver flows.
Among other developments, the early modern period saw a substantial growth in the volume and
value o f long distance trading. In Spanish America, the development of transpacific trade helped
to transform colonial markets into sites o f global consumption where consumers could choose
between European, Asian, and thanks to Portuguese transatlantic trade, African commodities.
Understanding the larger forces at work in facilitating and shaping Asian-American trade and
Spanish American economic development in general, demands that knowledge of global
economic structures be incorporated into future research. Therefore, like prior research, archival
sources pertaining to the Manila Galleon need to be examined within a global economic
183 O.H.K. Spate, The Pacific Since Magellan, 226.
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framework that recognizes the economic weight of Asia in general and China specifically
throughout the early modem period.
As this paper has demonstrated, interpreting primary sources using a global market
framework elevates the opening of transpacific trade to a level o f global significance that earlier
historians, with the recent exception of Flynn and Giraldez, either downplayed or failed to
recognize. Again, the research presented here is based on a very narrow survey of primary
documents. Therefore, the vast majority of archival sources that past historians utilized when
conducting research on the Manila Galleon await revisiting. However, a large portion of these
sources were official Spanish documents housed in the Archivo General de Indias. While these
sources may yield further insights into the Manila Galleon trade network, colonial archives in
Latin America offer the most promising potential for future research. In particular, notary
records pertaining to colonial merchant activity represent a voluminous but little utilized source.
These records, which frequently contain commercial inventories or detail short-term contracts
between merchants, can shed light on the extent and impact of the trade in and consumption of
Asian imports in Spanish America.
In particular, notary records could potentially identify the precise type and even quantity
of Asian goods reaching New World markets. This knowledge would go a long way in offering a
more balanced understanding o f transpacific trade in contrast to the current focus on silver flows
to Asia. While silver played a central role in transpacific commerce, it represents only one side of
the story. Any bullion that entered the Chinese silver sink was exchanged for other commodities.
Despite the fact that William Schurz called “the manifest lists of the [Manila] galleons a veritable
catalogue of the products o f the Orient,” knowledge concerning the variety and quantity of
Asian goods arriving at Acapulco remains scarce.184 Goods exported to the New World from
the Philippines were rarely registered on an individual basis. Instead, merchants listed the total
184 William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 31.
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number o f packets being shipped aboard each vessel and declared to government officials only
the total value of merchandise contained in each. Upon their arrival to the New World, these
packets were seldom opened or inspected.
As a result of these practices, records detailing the specific type and quantity of Asian
merchandise arriving to Acapulco and other American ports are exceedingly rare. The illicit
nature of transpacific trade and the degree to which both colonial merchants and some officials
sought to obscure commerce with Asia also makes any effort to illuminate the contents of east
bound cargoes inherently difficult. Clearly, there exists no shortage of obstacles to overcome
concerning research on Asian imports in the markets of colonial Spanish America. However, the
heavy reliance of past historians on sources housed in the Archivo General de Indias may have
limited their efforts to present a more detailed picture of Asian imports. Therefore, future
research based on notary records could offer a more detailed assessment o f the variety and
quantity o f wares that were shipped to the New World via the Manila Galleon trade network.
Merchant inventories and contracts also have the potential to gauge the average price of Asian
wares compared to similar merchandise imported from Europe. This could, in turn, help to
gauge the actual extent to which Asian imports threatened to undermine the sale of merchandise
delivered by transatlantic trade and the merchants of Seville.
Notary records also have the potential to shed light on the impact o f transpacific trade
on inter-Pacific commerce in sixteenth and early seventeenth-century Spanish America. The
internal dynamics of colonial markets and trade during this period in particular represents a little
investigated area o f colonial Latin American history. Although a pioneering study, Woodrow
Borah’s Early Colonial Trade and Navigation Between Mexico and Peru, was able to present only
tentative conclusions and failed to spark sustained research on the subject. Along with Borah,
various twentieth-century historians, including James Lockhart and William Schurz, argued that
the opening of transpacific trade marked both a quantitative and qualitative change in this

99
commerce. Short of estimating the value o f silver flowing northward from Peru to Acapulco or
offering anecdotal evidence, however, these scholars were unable to put forward comprehensive
research that illuminated these changes.
Further research on inter-Pacific colonial commerce using notary documents could help
to gauge the impact of the Manila Galleon network on colonial trade patterns and merchant
activity. It could help reveal the extent that colonial commerce expanded as a result of Asian
commodities and identify what regional markets these goods were predominantly consumed in.
Future research, however, should not focus primarily on estimating the value and volume of this
commerce. While more precise data on trade levels between New Spain and Peru is required
there are a host o f questions concerning qualitative changes that remain unanswered. First
among these is whether or not sixteenth-century transpacific and inter-Pacific trade was
dominated by factors for Sevillean firms or independent colonial merchants. Again, past
historians have noted that the growth in inter-Pacific commerce gave rise to independent
colonial merchants who specialized in buying both European and, after 1571, Asian imports at
Acapulco. To what extent these merchants actually dominated inter-Pacific trade and altered
colonial trade patterns, however, remains unknown. Focusing on inter-Pacific commerce and the
impact of transpacific trade on colonial merchant activity thus has the potential to ‘globalize’ this
area of Latin American historiography by revealing how Spanish American merchants dealt in
global commodities and shifted resources between transpacific, transatlantic, and inter-Pacific
trade routes.
A focus on colonial notary records could help to augment knowledge o f sixteenthcentury credit markets in Latin America. The financing of transatlantic trade for the period
examined here was dominated primarily by resident Genoese merchants in Seville whose
commercial networks also extended to the New World. From their position on both ends of
Atlantic trade routes they dispensed capital to merchants on a short-term basis and at interests
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rates between fifty and ninety percent. How, by whom, and at what rates inter-colonial and
transpacific trade was financed is less well known. The more successful merchants of Mexico
City and Lima did provide credit for such commerce but prior to the founding o f Spanish
Manila, the availability of capital for inter-Pacific colonial commerce was undoubtedly limited in
comparison to transatlantic trade. The rapid expansion of transpacific commerce after 1571,
however, may have led to a significant expansion in capital stocks, specifically those of successful
merchants in Mexico City and Lima. The affect of transpacific commerce on the availability of
capital in the New World during the late sixteenth-century thus represents yet another aspect of
colonial Latin American historiography that has remained largely undeveloped.
Although the research here has focused overwhelmingly on the economic and policy
ramifications o f the Manila Galleon trade network, there were social and cultural repercussions
that await further exploration. Jane Mangan’s use of colonial notary records has shed light on the
structure and day-to-day workings of Potosfs urban marketplace. Her work has also
demonstrated that trade and consumption played a crucial role in the formation of colonial
identities. The purchase of Asian over European imports by various New World consumers was
therefore a decision that hinged on more than simply price differentials. Those who bought
Asian goods did so for various reasons and must have seen in such consumption a way of
defining themselves within colonial society. The introduction of Asian motifs, whether on
textiles, ceramics, jewelry, or furniture, also came to exercise a documented influence on New
World artists and craftsman. 185 Therefore, not only do notary records have the potential to
increase our understanding of how transpacific trade impacted colonial commerce and merchant
activity, they could also help reveal the social and cultural significance of Asian merchandise to
colonial consumers in Spanish America.
185 See Donna Pierce, ed., Asia & Spanish America: Trans-Pacific Artistic and Cultural Exchange, 1500-1850
(Denver, CO: Denver Art Museum, 2000).
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In closing, it is clear that there exists a strong need for further research on the immediate
impact of the Manila Galleon trading network on historical developments above and beyond
Pacific silver flows. Whether the focus is on Spanish imperial policymaking, merchant activity, or
the various social and economic aspects involved in the production and consumption of
commodities, future research needs to be pursued within a global framework. As advocated here,
not only should scholars approach questions regarding transpacific trade from a global
standpoint, they should do so focusing on the complementary demand for silver in China and
consumer goods in Spanish America. The wearing of Chinese silk by Spanish, Creole, African, or
indigenous men and women throughout the Americas or the use of the real de a ocho by Chinese
merchants and peasants, .implicated such individuals direcdy in the ongoing expansion of the
early modern global economy. As the early history of the Manila Galleon demonstrates, this
economic expansion both shaped and was shaped by the actions of merchants, consumers, and
government officials throughout Asia, the Americas, and Europe. Along with questions
concerning the specific impact of transpacific trade on early modem social, political, and
economic developments, to what extent the actions of individuals inhibited or aided the
development transpacific commerce awaits to be discovered.
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